Intended Date of Award

2022

Degree Name

Doctorate in Public Administration (DPA)

Chair

Stacie Bosley

Vice-Chair

Jae Hwan Lee

Committee Member

J. Dan Lehmann

Second Committee Member

Jae Hwan Lee

Abstract

This multi-article investigation examines corporate board composition and the implications for regulatory penalties. Director diversity on key board committees and board interlocks influence board behaviors as they relate to regulatory risk. Directors bring experience and inter-industry ties to a board position and subsequently transfer and receive specific knowledge, practices, and contacts with other directors (Hillman & Haynes, 2010). Despite this exchange, firms may suffer regulatory oversight penalties because different directors perceive and respond to risk differently (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Flynn et al., 1994). Leveraging the tenets of the cultural theory of risk perception (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983) and of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), I formulate hypotheses and test those hypotheses, empirically. This dissertation research combines existing theory along with board compositional data to explore the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance vis-à-vis a regulatory penalties database (Good Jobs First, n.d.). Examining financial penalties between 2016 – 2020 among firms in the S&P 500 and the firms’ respective boards, I advance a model that describes and predicts the type of firms at greatest risk for agency-imposed financial penalties. Combining board gender diversity data, board and director attributes, and social network-derived variables, this research explores whether gender diversity and highly influential directors bring greater monitoring effectiveness to the board.

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text

dc_publisher

DigitalCommons@Hamline

dc_format

application/pdf

dc_source

School of Business Student Theses and Dissertations

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