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Urban Neighborhood Revitalization: Is There a Middle Ground between Gentrification and Terminal Decay?

Jane Strauss

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URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION: IS THERE A MIDDLE GROUND
BETWEEN GENTRIFICATION AND TERMINAL DECAY?

by

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An Independent Problem Analysis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Administration

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May, 1992

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To Don, without whose patient support, child care and flexibility this work would have been much more difficult to complete
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INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

In the seven county metropolitan area surrounding Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, the condition, availability, and affordability of urban housing are major issues for the nineties. New construction in outer ring suburbs is attracting residents of inner ring suburbs who can afford its price. Urban dwellers who can afford to move to inner ring suburbs with their larger lots are leaving city homes. At times, this results in abandonment of older urban homes and spreading blight. Those left behind are disproportionately minority and low income, those least likely of all residents to be able to afford home ownership or ever-increasing maintenance costs.

In addition, a decrease in the number of young adults and others likely to rent small apartments has resulted in high vacancy rates. A combination of these high vacancy rates and tax law changes have made investment in rental properties less lucrative, so fewer people are investing in such properties, or maintaining them properly. Lack of investment and building maintenance contributes to visible neighborhood deterioration, further encouraging flight from neighborhoods surrounding neglected rental properties.

In response to these problems and the related ones of homelessness and declining inner city and inner ring suburban tax bases, the "Regional Housing
Task Force" of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council issued its report in March, 1991. Concurrently, the city of Minneapolis unveiled a "Twenty Year Neighborhood Revitalization Program," whose goal is to provide neighborhood input on those services and infrastructure improvements needed to enhance residents' quality of life. In early 1992, the city of St. Paul introduced a new homeownership and repair financing program targeted at the middle class. Central to the assumptions underlying all these efforts have been issues of affordability, neighborhood stabilization, and encouragement of homeownership. These values are cited as keys to the Regional Task Force's vision that "society needs to make a commitment to ensuring that everyone has decent, affordable housing . . . [which] is an integral component of their ability to be self-sufficient. . . . [It] would be a wiser use of public dollars and private resources to . . . invest in neighborhood revitalization before deterioration has taken place . . . . Residents should be involved in decisions that affect their neighborhoods."  

Affordable housing is needed, and may be found through repair of aging homes in the city and inner ring suburbs (21% of which are more than 50 years old). The city and inner ring suburbs wish to retain present home owners and stabilize their population base. Homeownership is seen as a means by which individuals are empowered, (literally) invested in the area, and actively work to maintain their own properties and better the area. Models for effective facilitation of homeownership and renovation are needed, in order to reach these goals of revitalization, stability, and retention.
Similar problems of population loss and neighborhood deterioration have been addressed in other urban areas in the United States. Some solutions executed elsewhere may suggest workable strategies for communities in the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, metropolitan area.

One unique revitalization strategy, recently initiated by a number of residents of the Springfield neighborhood in Jacksonville, FL and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, is attempting to stabilize the neighborhood and improve housing stock through historic preservation, while maintaining affordability for current residents. Springfield is a typical inner-city neighborhood, with a racially and economically mixed population and a recent drug problem resulting in an even worse neighborhood image than would otherwise be the case. It is similar to some inner-city Minneapolis and Saint Paul neighborhoods, with structurally-sound but aging homes built around the turn of the century. Central is a Minneapolis neighborhood of approximately the same age, size and location relative to downtown as Springfield, and suggests itself as a reasonable subject for comparison with Springfield.

Goals of the Study

Many models describing factors contributing to neighborhood and community viability, growth, and revitalization have been published in the Urban Studies and Political Science literature during the past forty years. Through analyzing these models and applying them to Central and Springfield neighborhoods, I propose to identify factors leading to successful revitalization
in inner city areas. By comparing demographics, organizational infrastructure, physical infrastructure, and history, I plan to evaluate whether the strategy used in Springfield (wide area historic designation, followed by intensive funding through public-nonprofit-for profit partnerships and neighborhood organizing to restore and maintain buildings and programs) is achieving its goals and might be feasible to replicate in Central.

Product of the Study

The final product of this research will be analysis of how both the Springfield and Central neighborhoods reflect existing models of neighborhood and community development, what parameters contribute to the success of any revitalization project, whether, by these criteria, the Springfield project appears to be succeeding, and proposed directions for Central or other Minneapolis neighborhoods.

Context of the Study

Major similarities between Springfield and Central neighborhoods are both historic and demographic. These similarities provide a superficial identity between the two communities and render them quite comparable. Both neighborhoods are about one hundred years old. Both grew through unplanned construction of Queen Anne, Craftsman Bungalow, and Prairie style residences. Both were initially solid middle class and professional neighborhoods, sited along streetcar lines as they expanded from the core city, with at least one
major builder or designer who was responsible for much of the home construction in the area. Each covers about one square mile and has a similar population size. Both are still located in reasonably close proximity to major employers, and provide convenient homes for working people.

Both neighborhoods decreased in prestige during the Great Depression and World War II period. Housing was in short supply and large residences were subdivided with resultant increases in population density. Both show visible signs of decay, lack a substantial local economic base, have problems involving crime, prostitution, and drugs, and currently have populations consisting of approximately one-third white and two-thirds minority residents.

Upon closer examination of the two areas, superficial similarities give way to real differences. While both areas have a similar majority/minority population split, Central is the more heterogeneous of the two. Within the minority population are significant Native American and Asian populations (6% and 11%, respectively, of total population). The Asian population has been an increasingly visible and viable economic force during the past five years, with newly-opened Asian restaurants, gift shops, and groceries adding an "exotic" flavor to Lake Street as it passes through Central neighborhood. Springfield, in contrast, has a stark Black-White division among its population, and few unique businesses are in evidence.

Economically, the neighborhoods are also distinct. Springfield is located in greater Jacksonville/Duval County, Florida. In 1980, Springfield's median household income was about one-third that of Duval County as a whole.
Central’s median income in 1980 was about 88% that of Minneapolis as a whole.

Property values show similar wide discrepancies. In Springfield, median owner-occupied property values in recent years were less than one-quarter that of Duval County, while in Central, median property values were about fifteen percent less than Minneapolis as a whole. In actual dollar amounts, Springfield’s median property values are about one third those of Central Neighborhood. The percentage of owner-occupied units in Springfield is about one-third that of Duval County, while the percentage of owner-occupants in Central is only about 20% less than that in Minneapolis and almost twice that in Springfield. During the past ten years, 65% of owner occupied homes in
Springfield were valued at or sold for less than $20,000, compared with only about 3.5% of homes in Central. About 65% of homes in Central sold for or
were valued at $40,000 to $70,000 during approximately the same period. The ethnic and economic differences between the two neighborhoods, while substantial, are not sufficient to outweigh their similarities. Central's population, while diverse, is still predominantly composed of minority group members. While personal income and median property values in Central may be higher than in Springfield, financing for purchase or substantial renovation of properties is equally difficult to obtain. Financing difficulties tend to decrease both the percentage of homeowners and the quality of building maintenance. Public perception of both Central and Springfield has been negative. This negative public perception is reinforced by white middle class stereotypes about minority populations and by media coverage of criminal activity, poorly-maintained, absentee-owned properties, and poverty common to these and other inner city

Percent Owner-Occupied
1980 Data

![Chart showing percent owner-occupied properties in Springfield, Duval Cty., Central, and Minneapolis.]

**Figure 4**

absentee-owned properties, and poverty common to these and other inner city
neighborhoods. The end result is that, regardless of the real economic or
demographic mix in either neighborhood, both are viewed as of low status and,
hence, deteriorated and undesirable.
SETTING OF THE STUDY

In this section, I shall present geographic, demographic, historic, architectural, and organizational portraits of the study neighborhoods, in order to provide context for application of theoretical models on neighborhood revitalization and interaction to be detailed below. Description of many contextual factors is crucial for full understanding of the subject, be it an individual or a neighborhood. Some descriptive terms will be qualitative, others, quantitative. Both are needed for a full picture, as some models to be used emphasize quantifiable factors such as economic base and demographics while others emphasize qualitative, relational and other less-easily quantifiable factors.

Description of the Springfield Neighborhood

Springfield is a neighborhood of approximately one square mile located directly north of downtown Jacksonville, Florida. Jacksonville is located in North Florida, about a half hour drive from the Atlantic coast, and is distinguishable from most American cities because unification of its city-county government, including the City of Jacksonville and surrounding Duval County, occurred in 1968. Springfield was one of the city's original streetcar suburbs.

Jacksonville's temperatures are not extreme, although severe storms, humidity and salt air can take their toll on homes. Major industries in the
area are banking and insurance and maritime trades, including a port facilities and a Naval Base. The city center has deteriorated somewhat since city-county unification, although recent attempts have been made to attract businesses and tourists by restoration of older buildings such as the Florida Theater for office and performance space and the Union Terminal as part of a new Convention Center complex.

Springfield was built at the turn of the century (approximately from 1895 to 1920), as a middle class and tradespersons’ community. After a large section of Jacksonville burned in 1901, Springfield’s growth was exponential, as new housing was desperately needed. Most residential architecture was in the Queen Anne or Stick Victorian, Prairie, or Craftsman Bungalow styles. Victorian was especially characteristic of the earlier growth period, and many of these homes are quite large, three full stories with four or more bedrooms. The concentration of Prairie style architecture, which is unusually large for the Southeast and is in fact the largest such grouping in the state of Florida, is attributed to the decision of one of Frank Lloyd Wright’s students, Henry John Klutho, to settle in the neighborhood. Klutho designed many single family and multiple residency structures including one particularly striking apartment building along Main Street. Many of the smaller homes, containing two bedrooms and only one story, were built in typical Craftsman bungalow style, which was practical and relatively inexpensive to build and maintain.

The initial population included many immigrants, including a large Jewish population. The former Jewish Community Center now houses one of the few
large institutions located in the neighborhood, a Job Corps center. This is one of only two such centers located in an urban residential area (the other being the HHH center in St. Paul, Minnesota) in the country. There are also a number of churches, a facility for homeless people, and, located between Springfield and downtown, a Junior College. The three schools located in the neighborhood proper, which were formerly "black" elementary schools, are slated for closing or reuse as facilities for "problem students." A large magnet elementary school complex has just been built near the railroad tracks along the northern edge of the neighborhood, as part of the desegregation plan developed in 1990 by the School District and the NAACP.

Today, the Springfield neighborhood is bounded by a chain of parkland, a freeway, railroad right of way and tracks, and a large hospital complex. It has several through streets, including two intersecting business thoroughfares, Eighth and Main Streets. The population is approximately 65% minority, mostly African American, as compared with 27% African American population for the city as a whole. There are also high percentages of institutional (22%), low income and female headed (20%) households. In 1980, median income of slightly over $5000 was one third of that for Duval County, and mean income, at $8,860, was about 45% of that for the County as a whole. About 46% of households lived in poverty.

The neighborhood shows many characteristics of decaying, inner city areas. After the second World War, many homes were converted into high density residential uses. In 1980, only 22.4 percent of living units were owner occupied,
compared to 62.5 percent countywide. There are large numbers of scattered site subsidized rental units, boarding houses, and congregate living facilities. Construction of an additional twenty scattered site units is planned, to accommodate displacement of tenants resulting from demolition of Blodgett Homes, a 654 unit low income housing project which was built in the 1940s as a "slum clearance low cost housing colony for Negroes", predating the 1949 federal urban renewal program, and has become dangerously dilapidated.

In 1980, 38% of living units in Springfield were single-family, and by 1988, despite an influx of "urban pioneers" who renovated their homes, the number of single family units was estimated to have increased to only forty percent of the total. Twenty percent of units were duplex, fifteen percent tri- or fourplex, and twenty-five percent in five- or more-unit buildings.

Significant deterioration of physical infrastructure is obvious. In one recent survey, 200 of 1800 existing structures were found to be vacant and boarded. In another, 85% of existing structures were considered "substandard." In many places, original hexagonal block pavements remain, having never been replaced or upgraded by the city. Media sources and the general population typically view Springfield as a dangerous place. With the advent of the recent "crack cocaine" epidemic, there is a more obvious drug problem resulting in an even worse neighborhood image than would otherwise be the case. Prostitution is also common, especially near Main Street.

Until recently, financing to buy or renovate housing in Springfield was effectively unavailable. This may be linked to public perceptions of the area
and resultant public policy and economic decisions within both local government and the lending community. A R/UDAT (Regional/Urban Design Assistance Team) study completed with the assistance of the American Institute of Architects in 1985 indicated that the team "suspect[ed] de facto red-lining," or financial institutions' refusal to lend money based on property location. Also, insufficient public funds had been directed towards maintenance of existing public infrastructure and other public services.

Currently, four groups are organizing residents and working on revitalization in Springfield. These groups are the Springfield Neighborhood Housing Services (SNHS), Historic Springfield Community Council (HSCC), Springfield Preservation and Restoration (SPAR), and Springfield Ecumenical Ministries (SEM). Each has a primary area of expertise and all try to work cooperatively towards the common goal of revitalization. SNHS and SPAR work in the area of "bricks and mortar," while HSCC and SEM are more people-oriented.

SNHS has been primarily a lender of last resort, providing funds for low and moderate income individuals to purchase or renovate homes. Its staff provide both financing and technical assistance, including workshops on various aspects of homeownership and maintenance. One notable area in which SNHS has done well is their "model block program," which provided targeted funds for specific blocks to encourage residents to improve and maintain their homes. This program has been cited in the December 1991 draft neighborhood plan as a factor in the increase in property values and visual appeal of the western half
of Springfield. The western half of the neighborhood has more homeowners and fewer absentee landlords than the eastern half. Because of this factor, more blocks in the western half have participated in the model block program, which requires sixty percent homeownership on the block for participation, than in the eastern half. The wider availability of funding for more comprehensive block "fixup" for western half blocks has emphasized discrepancies between the eastern and western halves of Springfield.

SNHS has worked loosely as a member of the collaborative, but my sense from speaking with Richard Harrill, its director, was that he was accustomed to working within his informal network of bankers and was resistant to any change in his or SNHS' previous activities. Mr. Harrill had been working in the housing arena locally for about a decade, and appeared to see the present revitalization as good because it provided funds but not especially exciting otherwise. His interest was clearly in financing and housing improvement, not in preservation interests except as a means to funding acquisition. His attitude seemed to be that if it worked, he would try it but not get too invested in preservation aspects of the project.

SPAR is a group dedicated to historic preservation of housing stock in the Springfield area. Its membership has been composed largely of white, lower-middle to middle class homeowners, who, until recently, have not even thought about their low income or minority neighbors. Minority and low income neighbors have thought about SPAR, and have seen its activity and its
identifying logo signs on homes as a threat, signifying impending gentrification, increased rents and taxes, and displacement.

SPAR’s members have continued to create islands of property improvement, but have not, until recently, expanded their vision to include the majority of neighborhood residents. One of SPAR’s expanded goals has been to provide educational programs and materials about local architectural history and heritage in the public schools, in order to encourage a sense of place and pride in the neighborhood. The goal is to counteract a prevailing attitude that old homes are always bad, and to teach neighborhood youngsters that old construction has positive value, and that newer is not necessarily better.

HSCC is a neighborhood group whose board is composed of residents and business owners elected from each of the four geographical quadrants of Springfield. Its primary concerns are liveability issues, such as availability of city services, infrastructure maintenance, public sector accountability, crime rates, and resident organizing for block clubs, crime watch and similar programs. HSCC has also coordinated activity with Southern Bell, in a successful effort to install dial phones in place of pushbutton public telephones which had been used by drug dealers to facilitate sales and warn "runners" of police presence through beeper use.

One of HSCC’s major programs has been a volunteer street patrol, whose purpose is to report crimes in progress, suspicious activity, streets, lights, or other public amenities in need of repair, and other problems to the appropriate authorities. This program was recognized as exemplary in a competition among
volunteer agencies held in 1991, in part because of its major contribution to a
30% decrease in the crime rate since its inception. There have been three major
barriers to HSCC's continued viability. The first has been that its funding base
was unstable, relying on foundation grants. The second has been continued
difficulty in recruiting and retention of renter and minority Board members.
The third has been residents' perception that its mostly white patrol volunteers
were harassing young blacks who were not engaged in criminal activity.
Deborah Davis, former SEM outreach worker, viewed this problem as stemming
from a lack of cultural sensitivity and understanding by White patrol members
that the traditional loci for socialization in the Black community are on porches
or streets.11

SEM is a group organized at the suggestion of the National Trust for
Historic Preservation to represent the interests of low income and minority
residents which were not seen as having been dealt with by the other three
organizations. There has been significant conflict between SEM and some of
the other organizations and staffing has not been consistent. However, SEM
has played a significant role in attempting to gain cooperation between parents
and school authorities about the new school built last year, organizing a parents
group to encourage construction of neighborhood playlots, and bringing an
alternate view of some perceived neighborhood problems. SEM has also
provided a link to existing services for low income neighborhood residents, by
helping them access clothing for employment interviews, clinic cards to obtain
medical care through University Hospital, and other social services as needed.
The Springfield Revitalization pilot project, initiated by members of SPAR, HSCC and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, has as its goal neighborhood stabilization by use of historic preservation with minimal displacement of current residents. The entire neighborhood has been designated a local and national Historic District, with exclusion of a few commercial properties along Main Street. The National Trust has made a five year commitment to the neighborhood, for technical assistance. National Trust participation has made a national design competition for the scattered site low income housing possible. Designs for single family, duplex, triplex, and fourplex structures which reflect prevailing neighborhood architecture are being solicited. The low income housing will be paired with an equal number of market rate structures in order to minimize its impact on the neighborhood as a whole.\(^\text{12}\)

Homeownership and responsible rental programs are seen as the keys to success of the project, along with continued HSCC (Historic Springfield Community Council) activity in citizen street patrols and crime prevention. Research into economic development in the neighborhood and marketing of both homes and business opportunities there are also ongoing. The project has public policy support from Florida Executive Order 87-101, which mandates consideration of existing archaeological, historic, architectural, and cultural resources as part of all municipalities' required comprehensive land use plans.

According to Mr. Harrill of SNHS, about 400 of the structures in Springfield had been renovated by Spring, 1991.\(^\text{13}\) He noted at that time that average acquisition costs would be around $5-$10,000, that average rehabilitation
costs would be in the $25,000 to $35,000 range, and that sale prices of completed homes would be around $60,000. This would result in average profits of about $20,000 per property. The usual problem of displacement should be minimal due to the large numbers of vacant and boarded structures available for initial rehabilitation. A variety of innovative programs, such as $50.00 monthly escrow in a "fixup fund," provide funds for ongoing upkeep, and 25% of the housing stock renovated will be designated for low income homeownership in perpetuity.

Major obstacles to effective revitalization of the neighborhood have been lack of funding, the scattered-site, unplanned and uncoordinated approach to development emphasized in the past, and public perceptions of the area. Rehabilitation of only one or two buildings on a block has provided little overall improvement in appearance, so that property values have not increased consistent with the financial resources invested. In addition, there is a concentration of scattered site low income housing, and Department of Housing and Urban Development "modest design" standards have resulted in structures which do not reflect prevailing architecture, as any architectural detailing beyond a bare box shape is considered "too expensive." Thus a number of plain, incompatible, preexisting scattered site houses remain.

Since Springfield is viewed as dangerous, people and institutions have been reluctant to invest in the community. The lack of funding availability and poor return on investment have severely limited willingness to invest. A major intervention in this cycle by the current revitalization program has been
concentration of funding for acquisition and improvement of properties in the neighborhood. SPAR has sponsored annual home tours and events with the local hospitals, major employers, and the University which emphasize the beauty and convenience of Springfield as a place to live. Concomitant with this has been a concentrated effort by HSCC to combat crime in the area, reasoning that, if the incidence of crime decreases, perceptions of the neighborhood will improve and willingness to buy there increase.

Description of the Central Neighborhood

Central Neighborhood is an area of about one square mile, located about 1.5 miles south of downtown Minneapolis, and directly linked to both Minneapolis' and St. Paul's downtowns by freeway. Two exits to Interstate 35W are located along the neighborhood's western boundary, with easy freeway access to Interstate 94.

The neighborhood originally developed as a streetcar suburb in the late 1880s. Until 1885, there were still a significant number of 40 acre parcels noted on city plats, some of which were being farmed until around 1890.

Minneapolis, where Central Neighborhood is located, is a northern city. It has warm summers and extremely cold winters, with temperatures commonly below zero in midwinter. It was settled around the same time as Jacksonville, and Central Neighborhood's period of major development spanned 1890 to 1920, similar to that of Springfield. The majority of housing at that time was built by working class tradespeople and middle class professionals, merchants, and
white collar workers. Platts show that in 1892, about six blocks were over half-built, in 1898, about double that, plus two churches, a school and a fire station, and by 1914, 48 of the available blocks were half-built, with the construction of an additional school and church. Development proceeded rapidly through the rest of the 'teens. By the mid-1920s, a third school, at least one more church, and a library had been added, along with the majority of the current housing stock, 97.3% of which was built prior to 1940.

Architecturally, Queen Anne and Stick Victorian, Prairie, and Craftsman Bungalow styles are all represented, in approximately the same proportions as in Springfield. In addition, during the period 1900-1910, a fair number of American Foursquare homes, typical of the Minneapolis St. Paul area, were built. The latter are typically smaller than the Victorians, with two story, three bedroom homes being quite common. Most of the bungalows date from the late 'teens through the twenties.

During the Depression and the years following World War II, many of the larger homes in Central neighborhood were used as boarding houses or converted to two, three, four, or five unit buildings. In many cases these new uses did not conform to existing or new zoning requirements; they were "nonconforming uses." Some of these were not discovered by the Zoning Department; others were allowed to continue, or were "grandfathered in," when their nonconformity was discovered, especially if financial hardship would have resulted from a change. The population density increased significantly.
Central’s boundaries include Interstate 35W to the west, Lake Street to the north, 38th Street to the south, and Chicago Avenue to the east. Lake Street is a major east-west artery which contains a number of local commercial areas and traverses most of near-South Minneapolis connecting Minneapolis’ western suburbs with Saint Paul. It formerly was a major streetcar route, and contains parts of several major bus routes today. Thirty-eighth Street has a bus route and many small businesses along its length, as well as the Sabathani Community Center, where many community agencies, programs and activities are located. Chicago Avenue is a major north-south street which traverses many local business nodes on its way through mostly-residential South Minneapolis and two major medical complexes en route from Central Neighborhood to downtown. It was also an early streetcar route, and contains major bus routes today.

The 1960s and early 1970s brought major changes to the neighborhood. By 1965, when a major survey of Minneapolis neighborhoods and their needs was completed, there was a significant Black population, especially south of 36th Street, although the minority population of the city as a whole was small. Studies at that time noted that the neighborhood lacked adequate green space or any playground, and had a lower median income than the city as a whole.

Route 35W was being planned and built. Initially, several blocks of Fourth Avenue were acquired and cleared, supposedly for Freeway construction. It was then decided that 35W would be sited west of Third Avenue, so a large tract bounded by and including the west side of Second Avenue and the east
side of Stevens Avenue was acquired and cleared instead, with demolition of a large number of turn of the century structures. Freeway construction resulted in increased through traffic on 31st, 35th and 36th Streets due to the entrance and exit ramps located there. 35th and 36th Streets became one-way, running in opposite directions, to facilitate traffic flow. The Freeway increased public perception of the neighborhood as a place to be traveled through, as rapidly as possible, rather than visited or lived in.

Meanwhile, the Honeywell Corporation acquired the Fourth Avenue sites and built inexpensive, suburban-style housing, which was sold under a low to moderate income homeownership program. The resulting structures clash with the remaining fabric of the neighborhood, all the more since long-term residents remember the demolition of many solid old Victorians to make way for these "ugly boxes." Resentment still lingers from both freeway construction and the Fourth Avenue project.

By 1980, Central’s population was 47% minority, including about 1% Asian, 6% Native American, and 35% Black. Central included about twice the female-headed family percentage of the city as a whole, 80% more population density than the city as a whole, 40% more families with children than the city as a whole, almost three times as many families in poverty as the city as a whole, and a median household income over 10% less than the city as a whole.

The 1980s have brought further physical and demographic changes to the neighborhood. Central High School was closed in 1982, and, coincidentally, the School Board did not adequately winterize the building for later reuse. The
first winter water pipes burst in the building, and its condition declined rapidly. Repeated attempts to close the neighborhood library have failed, thanks to neighborhood activists, although this remains an ongoing struggle. New rental and homeowner townhouses were built on the former High School playing field, improving housing stock, but diminishing available green space. Some older properties burned, many were condemned, and some renovated. Total population has increased by over 1,000, from about 7,100 to 8,200. The number of Asian Americans, largely Laotian and Hmong, has soared, with their percentage of residents increasing from 1% (1980 census) to 11% (1990 preliminary data). Percentage of white residents has declined by about a third, and percentage of black residents has increased by 20%. The total minority
population in the neighborhood is about 65%, similar to that in Springfield, although much more diverse.

Perhaps coincidentally, the median value of homes in Central relative to the city as a whole declined significantly, from about 3% less than the median in 1981 to 15% less by 1989. A number of factors are likely to have contributed to this trend.

One such factor is redlining. Redlining the Central neighborhood by local financial institutions has been documented by ACORN\textsuperscript{15} and in the local community press\textsuperscript{16}. One family's experience included a $35,000 difference between their property's actual purchase price in 1981 and its appraised value in 1990, with the appraiser citing as rationale the location in a "declining

![Central Demographics](image)

Figure 6
neighborhood" which was "economically obsolete." This assessment of the neighborhood was ironic, given massive revitalization on the next block, recent designation of the block on which the home was located as a historic district, and the presence of the family's very successful retail store within one mile of their home.

Figure 7

Inability to obtain financing for purchase or rehabilitation of homes in the Neighborhood, combined with the age of existing structures, is consistent with an increase in absentee ownership and decrease in housing quality and property values. Statistics show a decrease from 37.9% to 34.1% owner occupied residences between 1981 and 1989.
A second factor is public perception of the neighborhood. The media have often used Central as a metaphor for the problems of the inner city. Inaccurate statistics in the media have overstated the percentage of Blacks, and, although Minneapolitans like to consider themselves cosmopolitan and enlightened, prejudice against minorities of all kinds and the places they live continues. This prejudice is reflected in the perceived "desirability" of an area and results in lowered median prices of homes there.

A third factor in the declining median value of Central homes relative to median values in Minneapolis, but not directly related to conditions in Central, was major inflation in the price of housing in "desirable" Minneapolis neighborhoods. This increase elsewhere could have skewed the entire city's median values relative to those in Central where such inflation did not occur.
The increasing relative difference in median values of housing reinforces the public perception of Central as a "bad" place to live, and keeps median values down by lowering the values appraisers will allow and new buyers will pay for property.

Conditions in Central have begun to improve during the latter part of the 1980s. In mid-decade, the media painted the neighborhood as a dangerous place. Signs of decay were rampant, from pornography emporia on Lake Street to the closed Central High School, to vacant and boarded or substandard housing. There was a significant crack cocaine problem and prostitution associated with both pornography sales and drug use was common, especially along the Lake Street and 31st Street corridor to the north.

CNIA and other organizations became proactive in planning for housing improvement and economic development and in working with authorities to solve crime related problems. Block-wide redevelopment, combined with resident control of rental housing on the block is one means used to control population density and to impose social sanctions for negative behaviors. Block club organization and block watch programs have contributed to the effort. Most of the pornography related business properties on Lake Street were confiscated by the Federal government for back taxes in 1990, providing new opportunities for healthy business development.

Activist residents got and held the attention of elected officials and civil servants in the Parks, Police, Inspections and other city and county Departments, resulting in badly-needed infrastructure maintenance and improvement. The need
for battles with public officials and civil service bureaucrats continues, as residents fight for maintenance of such amenities as the local library, which may be closed despite its historical significance as one of four original "Carnegie" libraries in the city, and for continued access to Lake Street from Interstate 35W.

Central currently has four churches and a mosque, a branch library, a community center, and a recently constructed park within its boundaries. A few other churches meet at the Sabathani Community Center, and many social service agencies are located there.

97% of Central's housing stock is over fifty years old, meeting one basic requirement for a historic district. One block containing 24 structures on the western edge of the neighborhood, the "Healy Block," was so designated in 1990, as a significant collection of turn-of-the-century Victorian homes constructed by Theron P. Healy, a major builder and developer from the late 1880s through about 1910.

The Chicago-Lake commercial node is on the neighborhood's northeastern corner, and the Nicollet-Lake commercial node is three blocks to the west, along Lake Street. A large elementary school complex is located immediately to the east, across Chicago Avenue at 34th Street. A magnet K-8th grade school is planned for construction at the Park site, with construction beginning in spring 1992. The school-park site is also targeted for expansion to include a school-readiness center by September, 1993.
Organizations currently active in Central Neighborhood include the Central Neighborhood Improvement Association (CNIA), Sabathani Community Center, Southside Neighborhood Housing Services (SNHS), Minneapolis Community Development Agency (MCDA), Community Crime Prevention (CCP-SAFE), and the Chicago Corridor Task Force. At times, various ad hoc groups, including block clubs, two predecessor community participation groups to CNIA, the Southside Housing Action Council, ACORN, COACT, and Honeywell, whose world headquarters is located two blocks north of Lake Street, have been involved in housing and other redevelopment efforts. CNIA, Sabathani, and CCP-SAFE are largely involved in quality of life issues, while MCDA and SNHS focus more on "bricks and mortar," building issues.

The city of Minneapolis designates community participation organizations to represent residents' wishes in decisions made by official bodies. CNIA is the designated community participation organization for the neighborhood, and has served in that capacity for over ten years. It is governed by an elected Board, composed of twenty two people who "live, work or own property in Central." Representatives are elected from each of eight geographic districts in the neighborhood, eight "at large," and to represent landlords, businessowners, renters, social service and youth serving agencies, and corporations in and around the neighborhood. Many city actions, including grants to organizations, zoning variances, issuance of major building permits, and a variety of licenses (such as liquor, towing, grocery), require favorable action by the Board, acting on behalf of residents. CNIA also works with CCP-SAFE in organizing block
clubs and conducting workshops on personal safety and other issues. In addition, CNIA has recently taken an increasingly active role, working with the MCDA in neighborhood development. This has included participation in blockwide housing revitalization as part of a public-private-nonprofit venture, as well as an ongoing program of loans and matching grants for storefront renovation, combined with streetscaping along Lake Street and the northernmost block of Fourth Avenue.

Sabathani Center is a non-profit social service and development corporation which purchased a closed Junior High School building about fifteen years ago and has been renovating and operating it for community and non-profit organizational office, meeting and other space. Tenants in the building include County social service and other program offices, a folk dance organization, several organizations serving members of minority groups, nonprofits serving people with disabilities, two neighborhood organizations, including CNIA, organizations serving families and young children, employment and training groups, a non-profit weatherization program, dance and theater groups, and youth programs. The former schoolyard is used in part for a community garden, with ties to a self-sufficiency program for low income families and the food shelf. Sabathani is actively involved in current efforts to provide support services for young families through the Way to Grow project.

The Way to Grow project is a collaborative effort by a variety of city, county and nonprofit agencies to provide information, access to services, coordination of services, and support to pregnant women and families with
young children in Minneapolis. The program is set up on a community-wide basis, and services are provided by home visitors who live in the community. Services are designed to assist any families who wish them, and include medical, educational, and others.

Community Crime Prevention-SAFE (CCP-SAFE) is a unit of the Minneapolis Police Department’s Community Relations Division. The goal of this unit is to improve liveability, including personal safety, in city neighborhoods, by working with residents and coordinating action by city regulatory authorities. Each neighborhood is included in a district, and each district has a designated community organizer who works with a police officer. These staff members train block club leaders, provide assistance to residents in matters of personal safety such as workshops, information about crime watch and Operation ID, and facilitate coordination of city services to deal with problem properties and solve conflicts in the neighborhood.

Honeywell Corporation has provided funding for both community building and housing construction and repair. Its efforts have included funding for some neighborhood organization and planning, fix-up funds, relocating and renovating some homes which were removed for corporate expansion, and current interest in environmental lead cleanup, early childhood development and family support services.

MCDA is the housing and economic development agency of the city of Minneapolis. Its major roles include coordination of community participation group input to city agencies, providing funding for purchase of residential and
commercial buildings, as well as new construction and building rehabilitation projects, making recommendations for zoning changes, and providing technical expertise on construction issues.

Southside Neighborhood Housing Services (SNHS) is the local unit of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, and provides funding for mortgages as well as funding and technical expertise for new construction and renovation of residential properties in an area of South Minneapolis which includes Central Neighborhood.

In 1985, a nonprofit developer approached CNIA with a proposal to build high-density townhouses on several lots located in an already crowded block. Block residents objected to the increased density which would have resulted, and proposed an alternative plan. From this situation developed two whole-block housing upgrade projects, whose goal is reduction of population density and improvement of housing stock consistent with the neighborhood's architectural style. Some severely deteriorated properties were razed and replaced with subsidized new construction single family homes whose rooflines and other architectural detailing echoed that of original construction in the neighborhood. Less severely damaged structures were renovated and brought up to code for either rental or sale. Block residents chose whether to remain on the block or to move, and were assisted in relocation if they decided to move.

The block revitalization projects have been undertaken by a public-private partnership including CNIA, MCDA, and a major private builder. The original project, on the 3100 block of Clinton Avenue South adjacent to the historic
"Healy Block," is almost completed. The second, on the 3100 block of Fourth Avenue South, one block farther east, is in its acquisition and final planning stage, with construction due to begin in April, 1992.19

Lake Street, one block to the north, is targeted by CNIA for economic and commercial development, with associated goals of improving the neighborhood's image, providing useful services for residents, and providing local employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. The initial phase of this commercial development plan includes streetscaping and facade upgrade grants for a five-block stretch of Lake Street and telemarketing empty storefronts on that thoroughfare to existing and prospective businessowners.

Major government and foundation funding have been involved in redevelopment on the 3100 blocks of Clinton and Fourth Avenues, 1990-91 construction of Central Park on the site of the former Central High School, and construction of a new Job Service Center at the southwest corner of Chicago Avenue and Lake Street, which is currently in process. Central is included in the Powderhorn Community Way to Grow project, which is currently organizing and exists to document needs and coordinate services for families with young children. The Neighborhood was recently chosen for inclusion in the Neighborhood Revitalization Program, which will make available additional funds for projects directed at improving liveability for residents.
MODELS OF COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT

In this section, I shall examine a number of models of physical neighborhood description, development and function, and sociological neighborhood and community description development and function. The former deal primarily with "bricks and mortar" issues, such as types and numbers of structures. The latter emphasize human relational aspects of neighborhood, community, and local residents, and are often based in Ferdinand Toennies' nineteenth century concepts of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. After description of a number of models, they will be applied to each study neighborhood.

Early Urban Renewal Efforts

During the late 1940s, members of Congress became aware that areas of major cities had increased in population density, and appeared aesthetically and physically deteriorated. These areas projected a negative image of the country, inconsistent with the desired image of the United States as a wealthy, international leader. Also distasteful was the appearance of visible poverty, in a country perceived as forward thinking and rich. The response to this was passage of 1949 urban renewal legislation (Anderson 1964).

By the early 1960s, two major approaches to urban renewal had been attempted. The first was clearance renewal, or redevelopment, discussed below at 41. This was found to be ineffective; those who primarily benefitted from
it were private developers, who bought cheap land from the government and built high priced residential or commercial structures, with the bottom line improved by extra tax benefits. By 1961, it was clear even to Congress that simply moving slums was not effective. Then, the concept of rehabilitation of existing housing stock was introduced. The goal of such programs was to make financing available and affordable by subsidizing interest rates and increasing repayment periods. In an early study of renewal, Anderson concluded that, as it was practiced, it did not work. Application of cost-benefit analysis resulted in findings that between 35% and 46% of properties were not feasible to rehabilitate, either because of excessive debt service or rent increases or rehabilitation costs in excess of the amount the FHA could insure. If tax increases were allowed, the number of properties which were not feasible to rehabilitate rose to almost 70%.

Existence of funding for both clearance and rehabilitation programs, most of which were administered with little attention to their impact on people in the neighborhood, provided fertile ground for academic research. The new field of urban studies grew up around studies of population displacement (Schill 1983, Nelson 1988), interaction within neighborhoods (Jacobs 1961, Ahlbrandt 1984, Greer 1962, Crenson 1983, Wireman 1984), and impact of physical changes on existing residents (Downs 1981, Smith and Williams 1986, Laska and Spain 1980, Peterson, 1985). Case studies also differentiated between successful and unsuccessful attempts at revitalization in a variety of neighborhood contexts (Dommel et al. 1982, Schoenberg and Rosenbaum 1980).
As the importance of maintaining neighborhood identity in the face of revitalization became clear, processes were designed to provide for such continuity (Garnham 1985). During the 1970s and 1980s, historic preservation came into its own as a vehicle for revitalization. This raised further questions regarding displacement as it related to class and racial diversity (Anderson 1985, McGee 1991). Some organizations, such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation, worked with local preservationists to encourage maintenance of sense of place in urban and small town settings. From such interaction came the "Charleston Principles," which encourage consideration of historicity and sense of place in future land use, revitalization, economic development, housing and transportation planning efforts, and emphasize education and empowerment of culturally diverse populations to build civic pride.23

Finally, as neighborhood residents became active in a variety of attempts to improve their own territories and minimize external meddling, community organization literature blossomed (Alinsky 1971, Fisher and Romanofsky 1981, Boyte 1980, 1984).

No analysis of significant factors for revitalization attempts would be complete without drawing from the literature in at least physical, economic, and socio-political aspects of neighborhoods and their renovation. With this need in mind, my analysis will begin with examination of measurable factors, such as economics, demographics, and documentation of structural soundness. It will then proceed to less measurable factors involving human interaction in the neighborhood forum, whatever its physical condition, and conclude with specific
interactional factors related to population transition and diversity typical of the revitalizing neighborhood.

Neighborhood Development Models

Based on physical, economic, and social status characteristics, Hoover and Vernon have posited a general scheme of urban neighborhood development for "cradle to grave" neighborhood history (cited in Laska and Spain, 1980). This consists of five stages, and progression of a neighborhood can theoretically proceed in either direction along the continuum represented.

Stage 1: The neighborhood is built from the "ground up," and is composed primarily of single family or other small residences, with fairly low population density, and in one or more architectural styles prevalent at the time. Status of the neighborhood is high, with moderate, middle income, or above residents.

Stage 2: Increased density evolves from the addition of multi-family dwellings, larger apartment buildings, and increased commercial properties. Social status decreases as population density increases.

Stage 3: Original buildings are showing signs of decay, percentage of owner occupants is declining, original buildings are subdivided, industrial and other uses enter, status decreases as density increases.

Stage 4: The buildings are obsolete and decrepit, most residents are low income renters, population density is high and status low, this is the proverbial slum.

Stage 5: If the neighborhood is near the city center, through private investment or government action, the original buildings are razed and replaced with new development. The developments may attract moderate to high income new residents. Status rises with the new uses.

Not all neighborhoods reach stage 5 according to this model, although stage 5 is not inconsistent with the concept of upgrading through gentrification.
In *Neighborhoods and Urban Development*, Anthony Downs applies a neighborhood change continuum developed by HUD to the problem of neighborhood revitalization (Downs, 1981). Either improvement or decline can occur at any stage along the continuum, and will impact on property values. The continuum is comprised of:

**Stage 1:** Stable and Viable (No signs of decline, high status and amenities, rising property values)

**Stage 2:** Minor Decline (Many families with few resources, higher than original population density, lower status and amenities, visible minor physical deficiencies in structures, stable or slightly increasing property values)

**Stage 3:** Clear Decline (Renters nearly dominant, high absentee ownership, lower social status and amenities, many conversions to high density uses, minor physical deficiencies widely seen, may be some abandoned housing, declining property values)

**Stage 4:** Heavily deteriorated (Subsistence level households numerous, low status, major physical deficiencies in most housing, abandonment widespread, low to negative cash flow on rental properties, heavily declining property values)

**Stage 5:** Unhealthy and nonviable (Massive abandonment, terminal state, expectations are nil, very lowest status and income levels)

These stages are comparable to those defined by Vernon and Hoover, in that most newly constructed areas are in stage 1, stage 2 and the HUD stage 2 are roughly comparable, and stage 3 appears to consist of points along the HUD continuum of Stages 3 and 4. Stage 4 appears similar to the HUD stages 4 and 5, and Stage 5 is beyond the wasteland of heavy deterioration. Practically speaking, most American neighborhoods fall within stages one to three. Specific factors may influence the stage and direction of neighborhood development.
Neighborhoods also have life cycles, similar to those of organic beings. They begin as open land, cleared or platted for construction. Some are constructed all-at-once, by a builder or corporation which owns all land in the area. Others may be sold to individuals and developed lot-by-lot over time. The useful life of a neighborhood may be prolonged by continued maintenance and upgrading of properties, it may be cut off by a major disaster such as a fire, series of tornados, or hurricane, or it may experience gradual decline through normal aging of the housing stock. As with the stages noted above, declines can be reversed at any time, through actions of residents, policymakers, or both. Typically, wealthier, higher status residents have moved to new construction on the periphery of the settled area, leaving their former homes behind to house those of lower status and income. This is the pattern occurring in Minneapolis and St. Paul, which was noted by the Metropolitan Council’s Housing Task Force and cited above.

Neighborhood Upgrade Models

Downs also suggests three major types of neighborhood housing stock upgrading. He distinguishes them as originating with indigenous neighborhood population or through external forces. These three types of housing improvement are redevelopment, incumbent upgrading, and gentrification. Incumbent upgrading and gentrification are also extensively discussed by Clay (Clay, 1980), and applied to his study of neighborhood upgrading in Washington, D.C.
Redevelopment originates outside the neighborhood, based on public policy decisions and public funding or public-private partnerships. Location of redevelopment is based on the area and those in power's perceived public good that existing structures are substandard and can only be improved by their replacement. Initial residents are ignored in the original decision, and the primary concern for the residents is their relocation where mandated by law or policy. Typical is the type of "urban renewal" facilitated by the 1949 federal urban renewal program. Properties are acquired by eminent domain, demolished, and the land used by local government or sold to private developers for new construction, financed at least in part by public funds. Freeway, new hospital and school construction adjacent to Springfield and Route 35W, late 1960s Fourth Avenue construction, and expansion of the park-school site in Central are examples of this type of revitalization.

Incumbent upgrading, unlike the other kinds of revitalization, is not externally imposed, although it may be facilitated by external, public policy decisions which make funding available to residents. By definition, it results from decisions of current residents to improve their living conditions and is more empowering to initial residents than either of the other two kinds of revitalization. Typical incumbent upgrade neighborhoods are working class or moderate to lower middle income neighborhoods, with relatively stable populations and a significant percentage of homeowners. Incumbent upgrading limits displacement to those residents who wish to move, and provides financial and technical tools for those who wish to remain and improve their homes.
This type of upgrading is epitomized by the Neighborhood Housing Services located in many areas of the country, which provide financing alternatives for residents unable to obtain conventional financing. Both Central and Springfield have active NHS units. CNIA's block redevelopment projects and the low-moderate income and rental directed aspects of the Springfield project dovetail with this approach.

Gentrification is imposed from without, as well to do individuals or couples, usually without children, buy homes and privately finance their remodeling or, often, restoration. Areas subject to gentrification are chosen based on location, architectural and historical significance, and individuals' preference for a given type or design of home. The initial residents of the area are insignificant to gentrifiers, who often have little to do with their neighbors unless they are also gentrifiers. The result of this activity is a general increase in rents, property taxes, and purchase prices of area homes, resulting in displacement of original residents, even long-term ones. Most often, gentrification will occur in Stage 3 or 4 neighborhoods, convenient to downtown business areas and amenities and possessing either architectural "charm" or historic significance which can increase the value of initial investment. A variation on this type of revitalization, which would attempt to overcome the displacement of original residents and limit rent, tax and purchase price increases, is being attempted in Springfield.

There are recognized sociological stages, documented by Gale (Gale, 1980), in gentrification/revitalization of neighborhoods. These stages may result
in different types of social interactions, both among new residents and between old and new residents in the area.

The first stage is also known as the "urban pioneer" phase. Both Springfield and Central have been in this phase for the past decade, with first-time home buyers purchasing and using "sweat equity" to rehabilitate distressed properties. One term applied to these early homeowners in deteriorated areas is "risk impervious," meaning that they do not care that they are risking their investment. These initial pioneers may inhabit the fringe of regular society; those living "countercultural" lifestyles, such as artists, designers, mixed race couples, and homosexuals frequently take this role. Often these residents find a niche within the existing community; they are few in number, so do not threaten the existing social fabric. The pioneers begin bringing properties up to code and improving the neighborhood's appearance. After a few years, increasing media attention and visible improvements in housing stock may attract somewhat more "risk prone" settlers.

These "risk prone" are often young professionals, single or married with no or very young children. Their incomes are often higher than those of the pioneers, and their attitudes towards cultural and class differences are not usually as accepting. Some intend to remain, but many are primarily investing for future gains when they sell their homes. Some new businesses catering to the tastes and economic resources of the newcomers may open. Displacement of lower income residents begins, as the neighborhood is seen as "desirable" and market forces of scarcity come into play. Also, costs of residence may increase
as property taxes rise concomitant with physical improvements. It is at this second stage that conflicts begin to arise between the settlers and the original residents they are displacing.

Once initially-renovated areas have become thoroughly middle class, the third stage of gentrification, that of the "risk averse" buyer, begins. These inhabitants may make some improvements, but tend to buy from pioneers rather than original residents. Property value is a key consideration; the risk averse are not seeking bargains, as they can afford market price. More specialized, expensive businesses enter the area, and increase conflicts between the incomers and any few remaining original residents.

Berry (Berry, 1985) notes a sequence of inner city neighborhood population transition from higher to lower social status as new construction becomes available around the city's periphery. This is called a "filtering" concept, in that, as older homes are vacated by those who can afford to move, they "filter down" to those who have less income available. He notes that the revitalization process typified by gentrification as a contrarian movement to this usual downward filtering. His model for revitalization is similar to that of Downs, in that it examines both demand and supply side forces, combining the two to determine the likelihood of successful revitalization for any specific neighborhood.

Berry notes six conditions for successful revitalization. These are loosely definable as locational, aesthetic, social and economic factors. Locational factors include definable boundaries and a location near downtown or other
amenities. Aesthetic factors include historical and architectural significance with potential for rehabilitation. Social factors include existence of strong, influential neighborhood groups. Economic factors include initially reasonable costs, combined with confidence that a significant portion of the area will be upgraded with resultant improvement of government services. He notes also the tendency for inmovers to be relocating from elsewhere in the city, rather than returning, and the inverse relationship of pioneering behavior to family size. Further, Berry notes that inmovers tend to be highly educated and that often couples are both employed in professional, white collar, or technical fields.

Downs cites similar revitalization success factors, but further specifies demand and supply side characteristics, both of which are required for success. Supply side factors are those resulting in availability; demand side factors cause inmovers to seek out the area subject to revitalization. Locational factors cited by Downs include (demand side) nearness to amenity such as lakefront, parks, another revitalized neighborhood, or a strong downtown business district, access to good public transportation and schools, and (supply side) long commuting times from suburbs to downtown. Aesthetic factors include (demand side) perceived safety and (supply side) brick housing or housing with other interesting architectural features in relatively good condition. Social factors include (demand side) formation of small, childless households, in-migration of non-poor households, distance from public housing facilities, and (supply side) a strong homeowner-dominated neighborhood organization and commitment for increased city services. Economic factors include (demand side) rising real incomes, and
(supply side) loose housing market with restricted development of high-priced suburban housing, no rent control, financing availability, and presence of multifamily buildings which can be easily converted to condominiums.

Neighborhood Viability Models

Theoretically, some of the same factors leading to successful revitalization might contribute to the viability of a neighborhood regardless of its condition of repair. Many of these factors may be interpersonal, rather than physical, in nature.

Schoenberg and Rosenbaum (Schoenberg and Rosenbaum, 1980)³⁰ have suggested a four-part paradigm for lower class neighborhood viability, and have applied it to revitalizing neighborhoods in St. Louis, Missouri. Many factors cited by Schoenberg and Rosenbaum are based on human interaction, rather than specific physical or economic characteristics of the neighborhood. Some parts of their model conform to elements for success suggested by both Berry and Downs. In addition, Schoenberg and Rosenbaum's is one of the few analytical schema directed specifically towards blue collar and lower class neighborhoods, so that it is most appropriate as a viability measure for the study neighborhoods.

The underlying requirement for definition of any neighborhood is that it be a geographically-defined area with clear boundaries. Schoenberg and Rosenbaum find geographic proximity insufficient for viability without the addition of four additional propositions. The first proposition advanced by
Schoenberg and Rosenbaum is that common norms regarding acceptable public behavior are enforced. This is reminiscent of Jane Jacobs' oft-repeated anecdotes about "eyes on the street" and the safety function of public sidewalks and implies that, when neighbors observe deviant behavior or trouble on the street, they will act to stop it. The second proposition advanced is that a formal, internal structure which defines the neighborhood, its leaders, and communication routes, exists. This need not be a community council per se, but may be a church or churches, sports club, businessmen's club, school, or combination of several organized groups. The key factor is formal control of communication and a leadership hierarchy within the neighborhood. The third proposition requires either local branches of public or private resources or leaders who provide linkage to such resources to meet residents' needs. These resources may include libraries, social services, and schools, for example, or political ward organizations which provide easy linkages to needed resources and information. The final proposition holds that communication among organizations and people continues over time, leading to growth, or at least stability, in neighborhood networks and continued adequate provision of city services.

Relational Models

Another view of needs and goals related to strengthening neighborhoods is expressed by Wireman (Wireman, 1984). For her analysis of relationships within neighborhoods, Wireman draws upon census data, Tonnies'
gemeinschaft/gesellschaft model of interpersonal relationships in large groups, and Cooley's definitions of primary and secondary relationships.34

Primary relationships use the German "du" informal address, and are those common in the gemeinschaft/community/village scheme. They include family, playgroup, close friends, and other relatively intimate relationships which involve a good deal of self disclosure and resultant vulnerability. The physical locus of such relationships is both public and private.

Secondary relationships use the formal German "Sie," are formal, and stem from the gesellschaft/business mode of relationship. Examples include the shopping relationship, citizen participation in government, and other "arms' length" business transactions. The physical locus of such relationships is public; there are minimal secrets here and the interaction is open to public view.

Wireman describes an intermediate type of relationship, the "intimate secondary" relationship, which she notes as being especially common in community organizations of all types and fulfilling a variety of individual and group needs. Such relationships are based on a formal connection, such as Board or block club membership, and members have choices about the degree of self-disclosure with which they are comfortable. These relationships have quasi-social aspects, in that not all interaction is based on agendas and formal meetings; block parties and other less formal interactions may be part of the pattern. The locus of the relationship is most often public. Roles which are primary in the relationship are public roles. The relationship is based in public role obligations and their performance, rather than personal traits.
Members have definite role obligations derived from their performance of other secondary group tasks. The essence of the trust relation that develops in an intimate secondary relationship is not that of personal friendship but trust in the other participants' character and confidence in one's own ability to rely on or at least judge the accuracy of information given. For example, one respondent noted that one man continually asked her about the opinion of the Jewish congregation on certain matters. When she asked why he did not call the congregation leaders directly, her responded that he trusted her information because he knew her.35

Intimate secondary relationships are especially useful in diverse neighborhoods, according to Wireman, because they enable formation of functional networks transcending racial, social and other boundaries. One key element for maintaining this transcendence is use of public meeting places. Wireman writes of an apparently-successful block club whose participation rate dropped drastically whenever meetings were held in homes, and whose social events were minimally successful. She notes that by using public meeting places, the leader was able to include all of the diverse residents of the block in their public roles as neighbors yet still permit them freedom in individual selection of friends for more intimate primary relationships. Only by meeting in a public place did people overcome social distances so that they met as equals, neighbors temporarily setting aside any differences in status, tastes, or values.36

By using only public meeting places, any real or imagined notions of "turf" may be bypassed, enabling full participation of a greater number of individuals. Given social, racial and class differences in both Central and Springfield, these notions of intimate secondary networks and public space as organizing tools appear especially useful.
Another organizational/interactional view of the neighborhood is defined by Crenson (Crenson, 1983). Crenson views neighborhoods as incarnations of Locke’s "political society," the informal control mechanisms within a territory which enable its residents to coexist with a reasonable degree of regularity and peace. This is based upon assumptions similar to Schoenberg and Rosenbaum’s first proposition, need for informal agreement regarding public behaviors. The territoriality of the neighborhood is primary, and often provides the only linkage for those living in it. This is especially clear in more diverse neighborhoods such as Central and Springfield, many of whose residents are so racially, socially and economically disparate that linkage through kinship or membership in any voluntary group is unlikely. Membership in the neighborhood is voluntary only in the sense that it is governed by one’s choice of geographic location. "Because of the simple rule that everyone must be someplace, the neighborhood is probably the society’s most compulsory voluntary association," and the public role of "neighbor" is so generally defined that extreme actions on the individual’s part would be necessary in order to evade it.

Crenson views Locke’s idea as intermediate between formal political organization and anarchy, between the public and the private, between the family, with lack of public sanctions and the government with major police power. The political society has aspects of both, and as such is somewhat analogous to Wireman’s concept of intimate secondary relationships, more formal than kinship but less "arms length" than business or government contractual relationships. More important, Crenson views the political society as a force
which can work to preclude chaos when all other formal governing modes appear to have broken down, as in the widespread urban rioting in the wake of the civil rights movement.

In Wireman's terms, Crenson's neighborhood polity appears to be the informal intimate secondary network, built upon trust in players' public roles and character, and in one's ability to accurately interpret players' speech and actions. It is the underlying relational matrix which facilitates operation of more formal business and governmental operations. It is indigenous, arising from residents' own perceived needs for order and views of morality. It suggests Boyte's notion of community, as rooted in citizen activism and shared traditions, while providing individuals with a sense of belonging and esteem (Boyte, 1980, 1984).

Elijah Anderson (Anderson 1985) has written of the problems attendant on race and neighborhood transition. The interactions he describes are typical of those found in a neighborhood in which Gale's "risk-prone" individuals have settled. Using two adjoining neighborhoods in an eastern city as his paradigm, Anderson describes the social interactions resulting when newly-arrived middle class residents (both Black and White) devise schema for "safe passage" through streets and public areas in which they are likely to encounter individuals perceived as "dangerous." The common aspects of trying to guarantee safe passage include "mental notation," "stereotypic perceptions," and accepted "street etiquette."
"Mental notation" involves ongoing observation of those on the street, in an attempt to find out who "belongs" and what each person's role in the neighborhood is. Eventually, people may meet or speak with each other, perhaps in the wake of a fire or other emergency situation. Even if they do not speak, residents recognize each other, and develop some familiarity with and trust in the area, which may subside in the wake of a crime, but is then rebuilt. Mental notation provides a basis for common knowledge about and discussion of the neighborhood, and is part of the foundation upon which stereotypes are built.

"Stereotypic perceptions" are drawn from both personal and collective experience, the latter in the form of media reports or interactions with friends or neighbors. The major stereotype operative in changing neighborhoods, on the part of both Black and White residents, especially those in the middle class who have recently entered the neighborhood, is that young Black males are to be avoided, since they are likely to be criminals or gang members. This stereotype may be overcome if the Black male is dressed in a suit, carrying a briefcase, or in some other manner appears white collar and upper class.

Middle class people of all races appear most timid on the street, most afraid of assault. They supervise their children more carefully than working class residents, perhaps because they are less comfortable on the street or because they are in the minority in a changing, revitalizing neighborhood. Ultimately, Black youths may resent the stereotypes of them as gang members, and may overreact, trying to frighten middle class passersby. More often, the
show of bravado on the part of these youth is directed at other youth, and unintentionally impacts on others on the street.

Cultural differences also play a part in public interaction. As noted above, street socialization is part of Black culture, and is less significant in many White communities. Perhaps because of this difference, Anderson notes that Whites defer to Blacks in use of public space. The Black residents are comfortable socializing in public, and, especially where they are in the local majority, go about their business regardless of who else is present. White residents tend not to address incoming Blacks directly, but, either through discomfort or fear, to look askance or leave when significant numbers of Blacks have congregated in a public space such as a park or a street. There is a Black hegemony, in which Blacks become viewed as either dominant successors or invaders in use of public space.

"Street etiquette" is comprised of generally accepted behaviors which result from mental notation, stereotypic perceptions, and neighborhood oral tradition and folklore about why people act as they do and what enhances safety. It includes the Black hegemony in public spaces noted above, as well as assumptions about how quickly to walk, appropriate amounts of eye contact, and appropriate responses to different visual types of people. Street etiquette appears to be more dependent on class than on race, and older Blacks of any class often take on a "protector" role with regard to those of any class or race who appear uncomfortable on the street. As with supervision of their children, middle class residents of all races are more dependent on distancing themselves
from suspicious others on the street than are working or lower class residents or passersby.
APPLICATION OF THE MODELS TO SPRINGFIELD AND CENTRAL

Given the preceding descriptions of both study neighborhoods and of the neighborhood development models drawn from the literature, comparisons are needed. To what extent do any of the models apply to either neighborhood? Can the models, or a combination of them, help us to understand Springfield and Central, and to suggest future directions? Ideally, concepts from the literature can be applied to, first, understand the context of the present study and then used to analyze critical success factors for revitalization and to project directions for successful revitalization and outcomes of ongoing projects. Common factors reported by a number of authors may be critical to analysis of similar cases. Especially in a comparative case study, isolating common critical factors reflected in previous research and applying these factors to each case can help determine whether these factors are generalizable to other, similar cases. The critical factor model thus obtained may then be applied to other settings and its general applicability further tested.

Neighborhood Development Models

At the time of the original RUDAT study in 1985, Springfield was clearly at stage 4, as described by either Downs or Vernon and Hoover, that is, heavily deteriorated. 46% of households lived in poverty. Over 10% of the homes were vacant and boarded. 85% of housing was substandard. Crime was
rampant. 78% of properties were absentee-owned, compared with a county-wide figure of 38%. Poverty was common. Household median income was between $5,000 and $6,000, compared with a county-wide $15,000. Infrastructure repairs and maintenance had been infrequent and inadequate. Schools were old, and what parkland there was had been poorly maintained.

**DOWNS AND HOOVER/VERNON MODELS**

**Physical Condition of Neighborhoods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th><strong>DOWNS</strong></th>
<th><strong>HOOVER/VERNON</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>Stable/Viable</td>
<td>High Status/Viable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO</td>
<td>Minor Decline</td>
<td>Lower Status/High Density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE</td>
<td>Clear Decline</td>
<td>Some Decay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR</td>
<td>Deteriorated</td>
<td>Decrepit/Slum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE</td>
<td>Nonviable</td>
<td>Razed and Redeveloped</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Downs 1981; Laska & Spain 1980*

However, reversal of the trend, as noted by both Downs and Vernon and Hoover, was possible. Some new residents had bought homes and were beginning to restore them. There was an active preservation group, and some residents were also beginning to work on fighting crime in the area. The neighborhood was convenient to many sources of employment and services. The neighborhood, especially sections of its commercial areas, still appeared desolate.
in spring of 1991, and property values have not increased substantially, remaining at about one-fourth those of the county as a whole. Residential pockets showed significant improvement, and further changes were planned. The crime rate had fallen significantly in response to street patrols. A new small park was being completed. The neighborhood appeared to be approaching stage 3 again.

Based on the Downs/Vernon and Hoover continuum model, Central did not decline as far as Springfield had. With only about 1-2% of homes vacant and boarded, less than 25% of homes deemed substandard, and more amenities, such as new schools and a library branch, convenient, it was nonetheless firmly ensconced in stage 3.

In the mid-eighties, the major vacant and boarded structure was old Central High School, belonging to the School Board, and neighborhood activists were pressuring some action from that body. Crime was a problem, financing was difficult to obtain, property values were declining, and population density was high. Neighborhood status was quite low, and still declining. Median property values remained level through the eighties, although those for the city as a whole increased by about twenty percent. Median income was significantly lower than for the city as a whole, $12,000 as compared with about $14,500, 23% of residents lived in poverty, and about 62% of properties were absentee-owned, compared with 52% in the city as a whole.

In the positive direction, many block clubs were active, and there were both an active neighborhood association and some housing improvement funds
available through city programs and the Southside Neighborhood Housing Services. Now, gradual improvements can be seen, but the neighborhood as a whole still ranks in stage 3.

Neighborhood Upgrade Models

Downs (1981) and Berry (1985) each suggested a number of factors which contribute to successful revitalization of older urban neighborhoods.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BERRY AND DOWNS MODELS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors for Successful Revitalization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BERRY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Defined Boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Near Amenities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Historical/Architectural Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#Influential Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Reasonable Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Confidence in Upgrading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berry 1985, Downs 1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II
Downs breaks these factors into supply side and demand side, terms which originate in economics. Supply side factors describe what is available in the marketplace. Demand side factors describe what people or other entities want to have. The four major subtypes of factors defined by Berry relate to both models. These include locational (indicated by *), aesthetic (indicated by -), social (indicated by #), and economic (indicated by $) factors. Locational factors relate to physical location of the neighborhood relative to other parts of the city and to available geographic, service, and other resources. Aesthetic factors relate to visual and subjective perceptions of the neighborhood, such as its appearance or safety. Social factors relate to residents, groups and their interaction within and outside the neighborhood. Economic factors relate to individual or area-wide funding availability, costs, or similar factors. For revitalization to be successful, many or most of these factors should be present; the fewer present, the less successful revitalization will likely be.

Both Central and Springfield neighborhoods contain significant locational factors for success. Both have well-defined boundaries and are close to downtown, although Springfield is within walking distance and Central is better driving or bus distance. By car, Central is about five minutes from downtown Minneapolis and fifteen or twenty minutes from St. Paul. From Central, one can take a single bus to the popular Lakes area, or walk to Powderhorn Park, a large, 100 year old park a few blocks east of Chicago Avenue. Central and Springfield both have large school complexes adjacent and small parks conveniently located. However, Central also has a community library. Both are
convenient to many social service and church organizations. In both areas, freeways are often crowded and suburban commutes are long, increasing the desire for relocation near the city center.

Central and Springfield both contain significant aesthetic resources in the architecture of their diverse, structurally-sound housing stock. Each has some historical significance, although that of Springfield is somewhat more important, due to its role as major survivor of the great 1901 fire which ravaged Jacksonville. Neither is considered "safe," although Springfield has improved in that area as a result of the HSCC Citizen Patrol's ongoing activities and their impact on the crime rate. Due to the slightly higher degrees of perceived safety and of historicity, Springfield appears more likely to succeed on aesthetic grounds.

Central’s neighborhood groups are, for the most part, older and more stable than those in Springfield. The two NHS units are approximately the same age, and have a similar funding base; other active organizations are much older in Central, and appear to have more stable funding bases. CNIA, although it must reapply for operating funds each year, is in the unique position of formally representing residents’ concerns within local government, and thus has some level of funding virtually guaranteed. In addition, CNIA has successfully applied for grants for a large number of projects during the past five years, and has realized its goals, at least in part, on most of them. Each neighborhood has had a number of small, non-poor households moving in as a result of local efforts to market homes and attract desirable residents. Based
on median income, the number of non-poor residents, both new and old, in Central appears to be greater than their number in Springfield. Socially, Central appears more likely to be successful than Springfield.

Economically, both neighborhoods contain large numbers of reasonably-priced, repairable, architecturally-interesting homes, in regions where suburban housing is expensive.

Given the many areas in which the two neighborhoods are similar, and the few significant differences, likelihood of successful revitalization, based on Berry's and Downs' criteria, is about the same for both neighborhoods.

Neighborhood Viability Models

Both Central and Springfield are considered to be relatively low-status, working or lower income, neighborhoods. This public perception of the two neighborhoods suggests that Schoenberg and Rosenbaum's analysis of "Neighborhoods That Work" is appropriately applied. Both study neighborhoods conform to the underlying geographic definition in Schoenberg and Rosenbaum's low-income or working class neighborhood viability theory. They are distinct geographically, with major thoroughfares, freeways, or different uses dividing them from contiguous neighborhoods. Residents identify with their neighborhood rather than with the city as a whole.

Both neighborhoods also meet proposition one, at least to some degree and in local block club areas. There are some cultural differences, notably
disagreement between white middle class values and black lower class values, about the street as an appropriate meeting place, which can result in localized conflict. However, with regard to most types of deviant behavior, such as public drunkenness, prostitution, drug dealing, and crimes against persons and property, including domestic violence, there is generalized agreement. With or without organized crime watch or patrol programs, neighbors attempt intervention or at least summon authorities. In Central, the formal network for action has been through block clubs and work with the CCP-SAFE program. In Springfield, the formal network has been through HSCC’s citizen patrol.

Proposition two appears to be met by existence of HSCC and CNIA, respectively. Both organizations do have weaknesses, in being primarily
identified with homeowners and typically having difficulty in retaining renter representatives. HSCC has also been primarily identified with the white neighborhood minority. CNIA's Board has been about evenly divided between black and white participation for at least the past three years, with leadership on the Executive Committee also divided. Efforts are now underway to actively recruit Asian and Native American members.

Proposition three appears to be show Central as more viable than Springfield, especially if resources located in or adjacent to the neighborhood are considered. The library, many branches of county departments at Sabathani, the new park, the new Job Service Center at the Northeast corner of the neighborhood, and the schools adjacent to and to be built in the neighborhood all provide easy access to services. Central's City Councilwoman, who is currently Council President, has been very responsive to her constituency and has wielded considerable power on the neighborhood's behalf.

In Springfield, there are few local facilities other than the hospitals and their clinics, and the new school along the periphery. The previous councilmember was well educated about preservation issues and represented that faction's interests well. General city services certainly did improve in the past five years, in large measure due to continued action by HSCC members and staff. However, that councilmember was defeated in the last election, and the degree of responsiveness to preservation and revitalization by the new councilmember, who lives outside the neighborhood, is still unclear.
Proposition four also appears to find Central as the more stable neighborhood. During the past five years, CNIA has continued to seek out and obtain new sources of grant funding, and has expanded its sphere of influence and the scope of projects in which it has been involved, even without the participation of "big guns" such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation.

Springfield residents and activists have admitted to the tenuous nature of their organizations' continued existence, with the exception of SNHS. HSCC recently lost its executive director, due to inability to maintain funding. SEM has only a part time outreach worker, again due to inability to maintain a funding base. The director of SPAR was originally a volunteer and will likely continue in that manner even after funding is no longer available, because she believes in the organization's mission. All government employees and community people with whom I spoke noted that a primary role the National Trust had played in neighborhood revitalization was providing credibility and increasing the willingness of foundations, banks and other large institutions to provide needed funding. One estimate was that National Trust involvement in revitalization brought as much as $6.5 million into the neighborhood.42

Based on the four parameters outlined by Schoenberg and Rosenbaum, Central appears to be more functional than Springfield. This viability should be an asset as increased efforts to improve the area's housing stock are entered into. Any such revitalization efforts require participation and cooperation of existing organizations and informal networks for their success. Such social-
organizational interactions are described by Wireman in the context of community organizing.

Relational Models

Wireman's notion of intimate secondary relationships is, by definition, applicable to the various community groups which are active in the neighborhood life of both Central and Springfield. Relationships endure at some level even after individuals have left a board or task force, based on their length of service and degree of commitment to the organization. Informal helping networks exist, which have been harnessed through block clubs and, in Springfield, through SEM and SPAR. Wireman's emphasis upon need for public meeting locations has been confirmed by local experience, although geographic location of the public meetings has also been a factor in attendance.

In Central, only recently has a centrally-located public meeting facility become available, at the new park facility. Prior to renovation of the gym, most meetings were held at the library or Sabathani, in the southern half, or at an American Legion post in the northern half of the neighborhood. Residents of the northern half of the neighborhood often complained that the southern locations were "too far," and residents of the southern area complained that the northern site was "too far." In addition, the location and reputation of the American Legion post raised safety concerns for some meeting participants, who feared unwitting involvement in street fights outside the
building. While public facilities were unavailable, block clubs were difficult to start and maintain, especially on racially and socially mixed blocks. Some homeowners expressed reluctance to invite low-income renters into their homes, claiming fear of subsequent robbery. This fear was often based upon stereotypes about the nature of low income apartment dwellers and their family networks.

Springfield appears to deal with the problem of public meetingplaces by using organizations' offices, all of which are located relatively centrally and on main thoroughfares. SEM has also met at area churches which, while dedicated to a particular religion, are nonetheless more public than homes would be.

Crenson's image of the neighborhood polity varies in its applicability in Springfield and in Central. The community organization in Central has more formal legitimacy because of city planners' intentional division of Minneapolis into "neighborhoods" and "communities" and the recognition of given organizations as formal resident representatives. Thus, CNIA holds some more formal ability to aid or sanction individuals by supporting or denying license or funding requests than does HSCC. For example, concerns over behavioral control at a proposed teen center recently led CNIA and two adjacent neighborhood groups to oppose a parking variance which would have permitted its opening. This opposition provided support for the Councilmember's attempt to block issuance of the variance, pending further documentation of how control over youths' behavior would be maintained.43
While HSCC enjoys no formal standing in Jacksonville, its ongoing citizen patrols have increased organizational power to informally control both criminal behavior and provision of city services. Although there is no formal police power, both wrongdoers and the city are on notice that HSCC and its volunteers will interact on a regular basis, with predictable outcomes. Law enforcement personnel have learned through experience that the Patrol is accurate in its assessment of street situations and does make their job easier, given prompt response. Criminals limit their antisocial behaviors and desist when the Patrol comes by, since they know that law enforcement officers will be contacted and will respond. The city, through repeated contacts of HSCC and its members documenting service needs and insisting on prompt city action, has learned that it is easier to provide service than to deal with repeated requests. Both are instances in which the proverbial squeaky wheel has been getting the grease, and in which neighborhood residents have experienced empowerment through insistence upon appropriate governmental response.

Given the racial and class diversity present in both Central and Springfield, Anderson's model of street interaction has some applicability, although it is most directly applicable to Springfield whose racial diversity is less complex. In Springfield, Deborah Davis of SEM noted stereotypes and cultural misunderstanding regarding Black street-corner and front porch socializing. This misunderstanding has resulted in perception of harassment by the street patrols, whose members honestly do not appear to understand the problem. Black socialization continues, nonetheless, to dominate the street scene in Springfield.
In Central, similar mechanisms are operative, in that Black hegemony appears dominant over public spaces, such as the park. When the park first opened, Black youth went so far as to inform others that it was a "Black park," and that others were not welcome there. This led to harassment of Whites, Native Americans, and Asians, who avoided the park for a time, until the public dedication of that facility clarified its true nature as a park for all. Still, especially when large groups of Black youth have congregated there, members of other races tend to avoid the site.

A wide variety of residents often raise the problem of street crime at CNIA meetings. Most are especially concerned about the "minority youth" and "gangs" viewed as being the source of crime problems. This is, again, consistent with the stereotypes noted in Anderson's article. The street etiquette mentioned by Anderson is most pronounced on major routes such as Chicago Avenue and Lake Street in Central. There, at bus stops and major intersections, people of different races studiously avoid looking at each other directly. Especially near dusk, middle class or white collar workers almost run down the street. This is the passage through the neighborhood, where those uncertain of the specific etiquette expect speed to get them through. On smaller through streets, interaction is more open and informal, even among races. At all times it is quite spontaneous among members of the same race, with Blacks in particular often blocking the street with their cars to stop and chat with friends or acquaintances passing by.
Except in small pockets, "risk averse" property owners have not entered either Central or Springfield in significant numbers. Where there are a few, conflicts such as those described by Clay (Clay, 1980) may occur between restorationists and other residents. These conflicts include disputes over the importance of amenities, such as decorative street lighting and tennis courts, subsidized housing, and historic designation itself. Long term, lower income residents fear displacement by either rising taxes and rents or burdensome maintenance and restoration requirements. The Springfield project has at least attempted to address these fears; the preservation community in Minneapolis has ignored them.

Unlike Clay, I have not noted the primary conflicts to be between old and new residents, but between proponents of gentrification and proponents of affordable housing and reasonable maintenance costs. Some of the gentrification proponents in Central neighborhood have been long term residents of moderate means who have been convinced by newcomers that inexpensive money would be available to restore their homes. Rather than concentrate on basic needs such as parks, schools, libraries, and crime prevention, these individuals have directed their energy towards petitioning for decorative street lights and a historic district, based on unrealistic statements such as: "[The police] will have to pay attention to our complaints when we are historically designated," and "There is a lot of money for restoration of historic homes." Although some designation proponents had purchased their homes through subsidized, low and moderate homeownership programs, and one has since defaulted on his
mortgage, they objected to presence of rental property or subsidized housing on the block. Eventually they convinced a number of neighbors of the soundness of their position, and excluded the rest from any public discussions. The Healy Block historic district resulted from their efforts. At present, 25% of the block’s structures stand empty, and the preservationists’ unrealistic goals have resulted in social fragmentation on the block and have stymied block revitalization, through social disunity and lack of funding for their desired "museum quality restoration" of single family, owner occupied homes.

In Springfield there were more inmovers than in Central Neighborhood, and the fears of SPAR noted above are typical of those described by Clay. Conflict experienced between the Patrol and young Blacks, who perceive Patrol activity as harassment, also follows Clay’s description. There is a wide discrepancy between the incomes of the richest and the poorest residents in Springfield.

However, the majority of both HSCC’s and CNIA’s conflicts have been with government officials over provision of adequate public services. Both neighborhoods have large populations of families with children. The oldest structures in both neighborhoods hover around the 100 year old mark. Both neighborhoods also contain significant numbers of moderate income and blue collar residents, although economic diversity is more pronounced in Central. In these aspects, both neighborhoods fit the profile of the incumbent upgrade neighborhood.
Finally, Clay notes that in all successfully upgrading neighborhoods 1-4 unit structures predominate. Both Central and Springfield fit this profile, Central to a greater degree with its more than 80% small structures, while Springfield contains over 70% structures with fewer than five housing units.

**CLAY'S REVITALIZATION MODEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS</th>
<th>GENTRIFICATION</th>
<th>INC. UPGRADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Blue Collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Moderate Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Conflict</td>
<td>Old vs. New Residents</td>
<td>Residents vs. Govern-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ment Entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Displacement</td>
<td>Common</td>
<td>Unusual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Near Downtown</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Size</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure Size</td>
<td>1-4 Unit</td>
<td>1-4 Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure Age Years</td>
<td>45% Over 100 Years Old</td>
<td>90% Less than 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV

Clay's study, unlike those of Berry and Downs, found no substantial private reinvestment in areas with significant high-density, large residential structures or complexes. It is possible that the necessary costs involved in
renovation projects of such magnitude are prohibitive, and that, with the decrease in tax incentives for private investment in rental properties, interest in rental investments has waned.
CRITICAL FACTOR ANALYSIS

Critical factors for successful revitalization of residential neighborhoods may be defined in five basic realms. These realms are the locational/geographic, the aesthetic/perceptual, the social/interactional, the economic, and the political/formal. Berry (1985) has defined the first four major realms for the specific case of gentrification. I have added the fifth realm, to represent underlying governmental polity, laws and regulations which contribute positively or negatively to the feasibility of revitalization. Factors which fit into one or more similar realms have been more generally defined by Schoenberg and Rosenbaum (1980), Clay (1980), Ahlbrandt et al. (1982), and Wireman (1984). These will be discussed as analysis of each factor proceeds; the factors provide a framework for analysis of how successful the Springfield project appears to be, how it might be improved, and whether its approach might be applicable in Central neighborhood.

Locational/Geographic Success Factors

Locational or geographic factors are important for a number of reasons. First, the location of a neighborhood relative to downtown, commercial areas, public services, parks, schools, transportation, and other amenities is directly proportional to its desirability as a place to live. Presence of these or other amenities within the neighborhood may also attract and retain new residents. Second, relative commuting distances from the suburbs to the workplace may increase the desirability of urban living. If commuting is relatively expensive
or time-consuming, minor inconveniences of living in the city become less important. Third, if a neighborhood is located next to others which have been revitalized, interest in residing there increases.

Clay (1980) notes that revitalization is generally more effective in those neighborhoods containing predominantly small structures, with one to four units each. Definition of structure size is partly locational, based on where such structures have been built in the past, and partly political/formal, in that reuse and new construction are limited by existing zoning codes. A factor not specifically noted by Clay is the possible relatedness of percentage of small structures to percentage of owner-occupants; ownership of a small structure is likely to be more economically feasible than ownership of a large one, especially for the property owner of modest means. Occupancy in one's own duplex, triplex, or fourplex also provides an immediate, aesthetically-based incentive for maintaining the property well; the owner is always there and has to see the property all the time. He or she directly benefits from its appearance and soundness in addition to being able to share in any tax benefits of building maintenance for rental use.

Springfield performs well on locational factors. It is directly north of downtown Jacksonville, and within walking distance of both downtown, with its many employers, and the University-Methodist hospital complex, a major employer. A new (built in 1991), magnet elementary school is located on its northern boundary. A chain of parks follows part of its western boundary, and some tot lots have been built within Springfield's boundaries, after the need for
play space was suggested by the parents' group of SEM. About three-quarters of available housing is low density, containing fewer than five living units. This conforms to Clay's observation that neighborhoods with smaller structures appear to succeed at revitalization.

Local commercial streets divide the neighborhood into quadrants, providing an easily accessible commercial area. At present, this zone is dominated by pawnshops, secondhand stores, and a shoddy-looking discount store which has been exempted from historic preservation standards. However, the dividing line between secondhand furniture and antiques is largely one of age, many of the storefronts contain interesting architectural details, and renovation and marketing could bring in some new businesses, change the orientation of a few others, and radically change public perceptions of both Eighth and Main Streets.

The Jacksonville area has the largest land area of any American city as a result of the 1968 merger with Duval County. Commuting from suburban areas is slow, and housing costs, on average, are much higher than those in Springfield. However, Clay (1980) and many others indicate that most urban pioneers move from other city locations rather than from the suburbs, and there are a number of other historic districts, such as Riverside-Avondale, in Jacksonville, which are further along in their revitalization and more likely to attract inmovers. The other areas are somewhat further from Downtown, but their relative safety may compensate for the distance, and attract some new residents who might otherwise locate in Springfield.
Central neighborhood is not within easy walking distance of downtown Minneapolis, but is an easy bicycle commute, only about a ten to fifteen minute bus ride, and a ten minute drive via the freeway, even at rush hour. Park and Portland Avenues are one-way streets providing direct routes to and from downtown with few delays, even during rush hour. Central contains a number of amenities within its borders: a branch library, a new park with a full double gymnasium, an elementary school complex on its eastern boundary, a new magnet school, set to open in 1993 and about to begin construction, a community center with a wide variety of programs and services on its southern border, and a number of outstanding community gardens. The neighborhood is also about ten minutes by car from Lake Calhoun and an easy walk, from its eastern side, to Powderhorn Park, a large community park containing trees, hills, a fishing pond, both winter and summer sports opportunities, and diverse community celebrations and programs.

The housing stock in Central is mostly zoned R1 to R4 residential, with some "cluster" housing, a few coops, and over 65% single family or duplex. "Cluster" housing consists of townhouses or similar single-family attached or semi-detached structures. An additional sixteen percent of housing units are in three or four unit structures, suggesting that revitalization may be successful based on existing zoning and housing stock.

Central's major commercial streets are also boundaries, Lake Street to the north, Chicago Avenue to the east, and Thirty-eighth Street to the south. A secondary commercial street, Fourth Avenue, approximately bisects the
neighborhood and passes a number of small corner stores, the library, the park and new school, and the local Black newspaper's editorial offices. A new fire station is under construction at the corner of Fourth Avenue and Thirty-eighth Street.

The predominant businesses in the neighborhood are small corner stores, but there are a large number of restaurants, including many serving ethnic foods, on Lake Street. There are also a number of Oriental grocery and gift stores and an African grocery. A Hispanic grocery/gift store scheduled to move into an now-vacant storefront on Lake Street. Additional businesses include some clothing stores, outlet floor and wall covering stores, a large shoe store, and a number of used car lots.

About fourteen stores are currently vacant, and CNIA's Development Committee is actively seeking tenants for them. This effort includes available funding for facade and handicapped accessibility improvements, with a 1:1 match, maximum grant of $1,500, for existing businesses and 2:1 match, maximum grant $2,000, for new occupants of storefronts vacant for three months or more. The diversity of businesses may act as an enticement for new residents to consider Central, as a location from which one may walk with equal ease to a Thai, a Mexican, or a Bar-b-que restaurant, and purchase Oriental, African, or Hispanic clothing, crafts, foods and condiments. Existence of unique businesses, while identifying the neighborhood geographically, can also contribute to positive perceptions of the neighborhood as an aesthetically-diverse and visually-interesting place in which to live.
Aesthetic/Perceptual Success Factors

Aesthetic or perceptual factors are subjective in nature, but may be measured by a number of objective indicators, including numbers of historically-significant sites or repairable architecturally-distinct homes in the area, and public opinion polls. These factors impact on the desirability of a neighborhood through its visual appeal, historic significance, perceived safety, and perceived status. In gentrified neighborhoods, as "risk averse" residents enter, the perceived safety and status of a neighborhood become more important. In early stages of gentrification, safety and status are relatively less important than perceived historic or architectural significance.

Both Springfield and Central contain large numbers of relatively inexpensive, potentially-charming homes in repairable condition. The average property in Springfield is less expensive, both actually and in comparison with other city locations, than the average property in Central. Average property values in Central are about fifteen percent below those in Minneapolis, while average property values in Springfield are less than one fourth those of in Duval County/Jacksonville as a whole. However, a larger percentage of the properties in Springfield than in Central are in need of major repair.

Springfield has more historic significance than Central, due to its role in spearheading Jacksonville's recovery after the great fire of 1901 leveled most of the city. Central, in contrast, is simply another of a number of streetcar suburban areas which developed around the year 1900. One advantage of
Central for attracting residents is the very large number of large old homes along Park and Portland Avenues, in the middle of the neighborhood.

Both Springfield and Central have image problems, in that they are not seen as safe areas and are presented by local media as the personification of the "wrong side of the tracks." At the urban pioneer stage in which both appear to be mired, this may not present a major problem. However, should gentrification, rather than incumbent upgrading, occur, attention will need to be paid to safety issues. These issues are being addressed in different ways in the two neighborhoods. Springfield, as noted above, has instituted a citizen patrol. Patrol members are in contact with "main base," at the HSCC office, by two way radio. They report any suspicious situations, such as apparent break-ins, loiterers, prostitution or drug dealing, as well as damage to private property and needed repairs to streets, signs, lights, and similar public property. Central has considered initiating a patrol, but has been primarily working, to date, through the mechanism of block clubs and the SAFE neighborhood liveability program.

Springfield's patrol program reduced street crime by approximately thirty percent during its first year of operation. However, public perception of the neighborhood is still rather negative, and until that improves, full revitalization is unlikely. Central also continues to have image problems, and the new Executive Director of CNIA, Alan Ickler, sees crime reduction and improved public perception as major requirements for successful stabilization and economic revitalization of Central neighborhood.
Social/Interactional Success Factors

Social or interactional factors are important for both influx and retention of new residents. They are also significant for effective functioning of the neighborhood as a whole in advocating for and addressing residents' needs, including both revitalization and obtaining needed municipal or county services. Effective social functioning is necessary in order to resolve conflicts both within the neighborhood and between the neighborhood and outside forces, such as governmental or other institutions. A strong, effective neighborhood advocacy group is a strong asset in resolving both internal and external conflicts which are bound to arise in the course of revitalization, as a variety of discrepant groups' interests and preferences interface. Effective neighborhood organizations are more likely to have the ability to be proactive, presenting the type of neighborhood vision needed in order to plan for appropriate revitalization, rather than constantly reacting to external forces.

Whether revitalization results from gentrification or upgrading may change the neighborhood's social structure. Changes in social structure and demographics are not necessary for successful upgrading; by definition, the original population remains stable in an upgrading neighborhood. However, successful gentrification, according to Downs, requires distance from public housing and an influx of higher income, small family units (singles, childless couples or couples with perhaps one small child). It thus results, of necessity, in the type of social or class conflict described by Clay.
Schoenberg and Rosenberg (1980) and Wireman (1984) focus their attention on critical social factors for neighborhood viability. Major factors include longevity of formal or informal organizations, their ability to communicate among each other and across socioeconomic, racial and other groups, and assist in residents' accessing needed city services. Wireman notes particularly the importance of convenient public meetingplace availability as a contributing factor to continuing communication across class, race and status barriers.47

Significant social factors in both Springfield and Central neighborhoods include racial and class diversity, fear of youth gangs and crime, existence of many church, social and community organizations, and availability of public space for meetings and social events. Springfield is less racially diverse than Central, and has one major gap to span, that of Black-White communication. Central, with significant Black, Native American, and Asian populations, needs to form a network of communication bridges; one of CNIA’s unrealized goals for the past several years has been increasing participation of Asian and Native American community members. Each neighborhood has one or more ongoing conflicts, which existing organizations have attempted to resolve with differing degrees of success. The extent to which conflicts can be resolved and communication gaps bridges will be a critical factor for revitalization success.

In Springfield, the demographic split is primarily between Blacks and Whites, with small (less than 100 each) numbers of Hispanic, Native American, Asian, and "other." Most of those with higher incomes are White; local Black
residents are mostly poor. Interaction takes place against the background of a quintessentially Southern city, in which even school desegregation was not agreed upon until 1991, over thirty-five years after Brown v. Board of Education became the law of the land. During that time there were neighborhood schools, and those located in Springfield were "black schools." The existing school buildings are all quite old, and in need of repairs; as part of the new desegregation agreement between the Duval County School Board and the NAACP, they have been closed, may be reused for targeted programs, and the new elementary magnet school has been built just north of Springfield.

One problem noted by Phyllis M. Robinson of the National Trust for Historic Preservation was insensitivity of the School Board to the design goals implemented in the Springfield project. Community members were concerned that the new school's architectural design harmonize with existing structures, and that sound existing structures be moved, rather than destroyed, to make room for the school. They found the school hierarchy difficult to work with; eventually, buildings were moved for future restoration. However, the schools were unwilling to consult with SPAR or the National Trust on design issues. Parents, through SEM, also expressed some concerns about childrens' safety at the new location, near the railroad tracks. The new school is a massive stucco structure with a high fence put in for childrens' safety, which has been described as "prisonlike," and is not harmonious with existing structures.

Another major social difficulty in Springfield is the tenuous nature of funding for many of the organizations. SEM has functioned for six months
with only a part time director, who apparently has been unsuccessful at raising ongoing salary funding. HSCC recently lost its Executive Director, due to lack of funding. SNHS has independent funding sources, and works with a consortium of local banks to provide financing for home purchase and renovation; its funding is the most stable of any participating organization. While all organizations involved have applied for and received some new funding since 1990, participants agree that the National Trust's connections and prestige have been instrumental in access to funding sources. It appears that there is no guarantee of stability for most of the participating organizations after the National Trust has ended its commitment in 1995. 

Central appears to have more organizational stability than does Springfield. CNIA, Sabathani Center, and Southside Neighborhood Housing Services each have a relatively stable core of funding and credibility within the community and the city power structure. CNIA crossed the boundary between being primarily reactive and becoming proactive in 1985, with conceptualization and initiation of the 3100 Clinton blockwide revitalization process instead of acceptance of externally-imposed cluster housing. Since that time, CNIA has kept effective pressure on School, Park and Library Boards to maintain services appropriate to the area. CNIA also organized neighborhood activists and gained effective media attention for its efforts to halt the bankruptcy sale of a former "Sauna" to an individual whose primary work experience had been in the field of prostitution.
The Economic Development Committee of CNIA has sought and received funding from a number of new sources within the past year; the organization's funding base is broadening, and it has taken on increasingly complex issues and projects. A core group of neighborhood activists and three permanent staffers monitor private and government actions which may impact on the neighborhood, call meetings as necessary, and attend meetings and public hearings regularly.

A continuing problem for CNIA is the need to harmonize diverse personalities and opinions in the neighborhood. Recently, a CNIA staffer wrote an opinion piece for the local paper in which he stated that corporal punishment had been part of what enforced behavioral expectations of youth in past years. A Board member, graduate student and community resident who opposes any physical punishment became very upset about this, and the staffer was forced to retract his statement in order to keep the peace. My personal opinion was that the staffer had a right to clearly express his opinion, and that another's discomfort with that opinion was insufficient ground for violation of the staffer's First Amendment rights. Another recent conflict has resulted in CNIA staff encouraging false reporting of a neighborhood resident to Child Protection for breastfeeding a child past infancy, on the grounds that another resident was "offended" by that childrearing style. It is clear that CNIA is not yet secure enough in acceptance of diversity or in its self-perception to accept either divergent styles or opinions when publicly aired.

Another, ongoing difficulty is the attempt to "mediate" disagreements about historic designation on the "Healy Block." To date, CNIA has been
ineffective in facilitating any discussion, since past and present plans have been based on the assumption that all problems result from racial and class differences on the block. According to Alan Ickler, this analysis is based on what funding sources wish to hear, in order to approve planning grants. However, if the assumption is faulty, "solutions" based upon it may be wide of the mark.

Actually, all but three occupied households on the block have "majority" residents, and the Black residents have not been systematically excluded from decisionmaking processes. Most conflicts on the block have not involved racial or class disparity at all, but disagreements about appropriate process and the need to provide full information and conduct open discussion about, and cost-benefit analysis of, historic designation. Excess costs resulting from Heritage Preservation Commission requirements for construction and maintenance have led to economic hardship for some block residents. These residents are resentful. They see the designation as contrary to their property interests, and detrimental to their economic interests; one has even suggested a lawsuit against designation proponents.

While Central has organizations which are well-funded, long-lived, and capable of being proactive and monitoring political and other decisions, the major community organization is still attempting to gain the skills necessary to analyze, confront and resolve conflicts within its own structure and the surrounding neighborhood. Until these skills have been attained, development
is likely to be stymied in localities, such as Central, where residents disagree strongly about either desired ends or the means to their attainment.

Economic Success Factors

Both supply side and demand side economic factors are significant for revitalization, because they impact on the willingness and ability of residents to buy and maintain property in a given area. Relative costs, available financing, and tax benefits or detriments all contribute to this realm. Downs' analysis of economic success factors for gentrification differs in one important aspect from Clay's; Clay cites predominance of small structures, while Downs notes presence of multifamily buildings easily converted to condominiums. This difference may be based upon who is investing in the neighborhood. Clay appears to emphasize indigenous and owner-occupant investment; Downs' analysis may include large investors as well. Small investors will be more successful obtaining resources to improve small structures. Large public or private entities will find restoration of large structures and subsequent managements as apartments or sale of their parts as condominiums to be more cost effective.

Significant supply side economic factors for successful revitalization, especially through owner occupant investment in the neighborhood, include a loose housing market leading to reasonable acquisition costs, available financing, and restricted opportunities for suburban homebuying. Supply side factors encouraging investment in private, nonresident investment include, in addition to the above factors, absence of rent control, financing and tax benefit availability,
and presence of multifamily buildings suitable for apartments or condominium conversion. Demand side economic factors include rising real income, which is available for investment or property improvement and confidence in an improved economic future for the area invested in. Combinations of these factors will have different outcomes. For example, if real incomes are rising and homes cost the same amount in urban and suburban locations, but no financing is available for urban property acquisition, the likelihood of reinvestment in the city decreases. If suburban housing is extremely expensive relative to urban housing and financing is equally available, reinvestment in the city increases. Similarly, if tax benefits and targeted financing availability accrue from urban acquisition and renovation, investors will act in their best financial interests and buy properties in the city. If the city government raises assessed valuation unrealistically high relative to property improvements, investors and homeowners will be discouraged from improving their properties.

Lack of incentive to maintain properties eventually leads to visible decline in the condition of the entire area. Even when government agencies seem neither to notice nor to care about this, remaining businesses may become concerned. If this occurs, neighborhood reinvestment may be initiated or facilitated by private sector forces.

Ahlbrandt et al. (Ahlbrandt, Friedman and Shabecoff 1982) analyzed corporate private sector involvement in a variety of revitalization projects during the 1970s and defined three avenues for corporate investment in neighborhoods.
These are direct investment, cooperative venture, and corporate support for organizations.  

Direct investment often occurs adjacent to a corporation’s headquarters, when local decline threatens the corporation’s image or its ability to get and retain employees. An example of direct investment in one of the study neighborhoods is Honeywell Corporation’s commitment to providing funding for home repair and for renovating and moving sound homes which would otherwise be razed to make way for corporate physical expansion.

Cooperative ventures with neighborhood organizations provide funding and technical knowledge to organizations which provide their own knowledge of organizing and planning for residents they represent. Examples of cooperative ventures in the study neighborhoods include the bank consortium working with Springfield Neighborhood Housing Services to provide targeted homeownership loans and the public-private-nonprofit partnership for block revitalization in Central Neighborhood.

Funding of neighborhood organizations is often provided through a nonprofit foundation funded by the corporation. The specific example cited by Ahlbrandt is the Dayton Hudson Corporation’s support of the Whittier Alliance, in the neighborhood located directly northwest of Central, across Lake Street and Interstate Route 35W. Both Dayton Hudson and Honeywell have also provided support for specific programs of CNIA.

The major supply-side difficulty in both Springfield and Central prior to present revitalization efforts was redlining, resulting in lack of funding through
usual lenders such as banks and mortgage companies. Suburban housing was relatively available in both locations, until recent downturns in the housing market. The incentive to buy in the city was not there, nor was funding available.

Increased mortgage availability for residential purchase and restoration has been a major focus of the Springfield project, as the National Trust noted that one reason for continued decline was the lack of housing in "move in" condition and of funding to improve and maintain existing structures. Area banks, in conjunction with SNHS, have formed a consortium which has committed $3.5 million for first mortgages and rehabilitation/construction loans. In addition, the city has committed $150,000 in targeted homeowner loans and $600,000 in targeted rental rehabilitation loans.

The amount of funding available in Springfield is deceptively low, however. The Jacksonville Planning Department has estimated that typical infill housing construction costs about $30,000-$40,000 per unit. Rehabilitation and restoration costs vary. According to Robert Disher, some private builders have purchased bungalows for $5,000 or $10,000, spent $15,000 to $20,000 on renovation consistent with historic requirements, and then sold them for $40,000. The SPAR-SNHS low/moderate income housing program, at the other extreme, spent over $100,000 artistically restoring a home which then sold for $50,000.

In Central neighborhood, construction costs of compatible infill housing have generally been in the $70,000 to $100,000 range. Those properties owned by MCDA were acquired for $5,000, $10,000, and $5,000, respectively. Estimates
for historically-acceptable renovation of the three properties were obtained, based on the size of each and local "industry standard" costs, and ranged from $179,600 to $211,700, for total acquisition and renovation costs of $184,600, $200,000, and $216,700, respectively. MCDA staff estimate the maximum realistic selling price of homes in Central Neighborhood at present to be about $75,000, which would require government subsidies of between $104,600 and $136,700 for each property. Some of the cost differences between the two neighborhoods have been due to the need for basements and additional insulation in the cold north, adding to material costs, and the power of unions in Minnesota, resulting in higher labor costs. In order for a comparable amount of rehabilitation and construction to be accomplished in Central neighborhood, two to three times as much funding would be required.

"Redlining" is still seen as a major difficulty in Central neighborhood, although funding availability has improved. Funding has been made available in CNIA's project areas, through the MCDA. Local banks, including Marquette, Twin City Federal, Norwest, and First Bank Systems, have recently begun targeting inner city neighborhoods for owner-occupant financing. Some programs, such as Twin City Federal's, lend only to low income people; others, as Marquette's, are more flexible in their administration and will even lend to middle class people wishing to buy in Central. The latter type of program is desirable, as it will lend to increasing neighborhood diversity, rather than further "ghettoization" or gentrification through lack of available funding.
Neither Central nor Springfield has any form of rent control, although the Springfield project has made an additional commitment to keeping about 25% of available housing affordable to low income persons. Both areas have been somewhat negatively impacted by economic recession, although the Upper Midwest has been less affected than parts of the South. Still, costs are higher in Minnesota, so that the relative impact of recession is probably about the same, if not higher in Minnesota. Demand for urban residence and historic housing appear comparable in the two neighborhoods as well.

Political/Formal Success Factors

The political/formal realm encompasses such factors as current zoning, law, and regulation, as well as legally-defined political structures which impact directly on the social and economic realms. Favorable zoning or zoning changes to decrease density can contribute enormously to the possibility of revitalization, by increasing the number of structures with four or fewer living units, those defined by Clay as most likely to contribute to neighborhood revitalization. State laws or executive orders, such as Florida’s Executive Order No. 87-101, mandating comprehensive city planning including consideration of historic resources, support gentrification, or at least revitalization consistent with Department of the Interior standards for historic buildings. Availability of a Historic Preservation ordinance can also facilitate or limit development, depending on its application.
Formal historic designation, as on the Healy Block in Central Neighborhood or the entirety of Springfield Neighborhood, impacts directly on both incentives for revitalization and what can be included in revitalization. Designation and zoning together have a major impact on tax consequences of expenditures and thus on economic viability of any changes. For example, historic preservation tax credits apply only to commercial or income property. Owner occupied, nonrental property is ineligible for preservation tax credits. Restoration of a number of homes in a historically Black neighborhood in Macon, Georgia was rendered financially feasible by stacking low income (Section 8) and preservation tax credits to entice involvement of private investors in a cooperative venture with a local nonprofit entity. Low income and preservation tax credits are also part of the financing packages for restoration by SPAR and SNHS of some rental duplexes in Springfield neighborhood.

Resident decisions, as on Healy Block, to limit property usage to single family residential, owner occupied, severely limit funding source availability and jeopardize the possibility of revitalization. Partly as a result of such decisions, six properties of the twenty four on the block stand empty. Three of those were acquired by MCDA, but there is insufficient funding to permit their renovation as single family, owner-occupied homes. One is on the market, and appears unlikely to sell. One was stripped of interior architectural detail, such as original fixtures, fireplace mantles, and other woodwork, which were "put into storage" by the owner prior to default and the mortgage company's entering into possession in late March. One stands condemned and empty, its absentee owner
unable to afford the degree of restoration required by the Department of the Interior guidelines. Were the properties to be renovated as owner-occupied duplexes, additional funding would be available for both renovation and purchase financing.57

Appropriate zoning is crucial for successful revitalization. For example, Springfield residents, as part of their design for revitalization, wished to decrease population density. A change in the zoning ordinance to require rezoning to original use of any structures remaining vacant for over six months accomplished this. By use of the zoning mechanism, many buildings which had originally been single family but had been used as multiple family prior to being abandoned, were returned to their original use.

In Central, a "40 acre rezoning study" is currently underway. This process is undertaken by the Minneapolis Planning Department pursuant to a 1965 law permitting comprehensive rezoning of areas not less than 40 acres in size within the jurisdiction of cities of over-100,000 population. An average city block is approximately 3.1 acres in area, so the minimum area for rezoning is about thirteen square blocks. The study is being conducted based upon an extensive land-use plan which was completed in 1981. It is centered on Lake Street and the approximately sixteen square blocks surrounding it to the north and south.

CNIA's interest in the study is in addressing commercial needs in the Lake Street area and decreasing population density in nearby residential districts. The Development Committee's Lake Street Revitalization has made funding
available for facade grants and streetscaping in conjunction with impending street repaving and ongoing zoning changes recommended by the study. Widespread public discussion since 1988 has centered upon the utility of allowing light industrial uses on Lake Street, when community residents are interested in obtaining more consumer-oriented commercial businesses there. Community sentiment has favored more restrictive zoning, especially in proximity to residential uses. In other areas, such as the block immediately north of Healy Block, commercial zoning, including renovation of older homes into office space, was seen as a possible buffer between the historic homes and more intensive uses, which were viewed as less desirable for appropriate economic development on Lake Street.

In Springfield, neighborhood organizations have attracted government attention through constant communication and, when necessary, complaints. The city has no apparent mechanism for formal recognition of neighborhood groups. It is in the process of conducting state-mandated land use planning studies, including recognition and evaluation of historic and architectural assets. Springfield has worked with existing resources to lessen criminal activity and has made some inroads into improving its public image; some forty families and individuals are waiting to purchase homes in the neighborhood. However, the extent of funding to carry out any neighborhood plans is unclear, and the financial and political picture becomes ever murkier as one peers beyond the National Trust's five-year commitment.
Minneapolis has both formal recognition of neighborhood groups and a conduit, in the MCDA's Citizen Participation Department, for their input. It has also funded a "Neighborhood Revitalization Program" (NRP), whose goal is to receive and process input from neighborhood residents about their needs and how these may best be met. Central is in the initial stages of planning as an NRP participant neighborhood, having previously made some inroads into economic development, residential revitalization, and program planning.

The city government appears well-intentioned, although the NRP is in its infancy, currently without a director, and future outcomes of planning processes and interaction with other existing bureaucracies are unpredictable. For example, state departments are not bound by any provisions of neighborhood plans. One clear goal of CNIA is economic revitalization of Lake Street, yet there is a fair possibility that, in expansion of Interstate 35W, some or all access from the Interstate to Lake Street may be lost. Such diminished access is likely to hinder both ability of neighborhood residents to conveniently access other areas of Minneapolis and Saint Paul and ability of residents of other neighborhood to access and patronize Lake Street businesses. It would also reinforce the view that Central neighborhood is not worth stopping in, but is a place to be sped through.
CONCLUSIONS

Critical factors for successful neighborhood revitalization fall within five general realms. These are the locational, aesthetic, social, economic, and formal/political. Together, they can define the likelihood of success for revitalization of a particular neighborhood.

Two neighborhoods of approximately the same size, age, appearance, and racial composition were compared. One, Springfield, is located in Jacksonville, Florida and is the site of a large-scale pilot project combining historic designation and restoration with affordable housing. The other, Central, is located in Minneapolis, Minnesota, has a small area designated historic and an active neighborhood organization which has participated in a number of small revitalization projects during the past decade.

It appears too early to tell whether the Springfield project is a true success. There is some disagreement as to this even within the neighborhood, even though many critical factors suggest that some type of revitalization will succeed. Neighborhood location relative to downtown and other amenities is very favorable. Springfield has substantial historic and architectural interest, providing a positive prognosis for improvement if substantial numbers of residents or inmovers maintain interest in historic and architecturally-interesting homes. Longterm vitality of neighborhood organizations and their ability to
maintain a funding base is of concern, given the inability of two of the four participating organizations to retain full-time directors and a history of fragmented resident participation dominated by the white local minority. Long-term financial feasibility is of concern, given some of the costs associated with both infill housing and restoration, which are substantial when compared with mean housing values. In addition, while the Citizen Patrol has reduced crime substantially, whether public perceptions of neighborhood stability, safety and status will change sufficiently to render Springfield a neighborhood of choice is still unclear.

Central's accessibility to amenities, especially given the uncertain future of Interstate access, is less outstanding than that of Springfield. Its historic significance is less, relative to the metropolitan area, than that of Springfield, although it contains a large number of interesting homes, most in better condition than those in Springfield. Central does not have a significant organized group of individuals who are interested in history or historic preservation per se, although the neighborhood appears to have a more stable general organizational base than Springfield. Its major community organization has a broader base of participant and economic support, based on diversity of Board membership and its ability to maintain at least one full time paid staff position through the past ten years, as well as official governmental recognition. The organization needs to improve its ability to handle conflict within the neighborhood; this has not been as strong as its ability to coordinate concrete housing and related programs in the past. A community center, a new park
and a large number of social service agencies continue to participate actively in community life.

Financial feasibility of residential "historic preservation" appears low unless at least some is for purposes eligible for tax credits. Costs associated with construction are higher in Minneapolis than in Springfield for a number of reasons, including the climate, Building Code requirements for insulation and basements, and the political climate, which strongly favors union member employment. Community perceptions of crime in Central and surrounding neighborhoods still discourage its choice as a residential neighborhood; one factor independent of this perception is increased media coverage of suburban crime, which may ultimately level the perceptual playing field. Other Minneapolis neighborhoods which have experienced substantial housing and economic upgrading during the past fifteen years, such as Lowry Hill East and Uptown, are now neighborhoods of choice. They are also more costly places to live. Whether Central will be able to upgrade without displacing large numbers of current residents is open to debate, although in its block revitalization, most displacement has been through attrition or has been accommodated within the neighborhood.

Central has a good deal of local political support for anything its residents wish to do, at least on paper. City government has committed funds to neighborhood revitalization efforts which are required to include substantial resident input. However, the program is new, and interaction with other levels of government uncertain. Still, the neighborhood and its residents and
organizations maintain a higher degree of recognition and legitimacy within the city because of the Neighborhood Revitalization Program.

Based on costs of "historic" revitalization, the degree of conflict generated on even a small area where this has been attempted in Central, and funding availability, a project of the scope of that in Springfield appears unlikely to succeed. Perhaps if the conflicts on Healy Block can be resolved and substantial funding acquired, this could function as a "pilot" within the neighborhood. Its location, a block away from both the first block revitalization and the Lake Street streetscaping project, is ideal and its visible restoration, in conjunction with other ongoing projects, could substantially improve the visual appeal of the northwest quadrant of Central and the neighborhood's image in the community.
NOTES


2. Id. at 2.

3. Id. at 1.

4. See Appendix B.

5. Group homes, treatment programs, nursing homes and similar facilities.


8. RUDAT study, 1985


10. Discussion with Dora Carver, President of SPAR, April 24, 1991.

11. Discussion with Deborah Davis, SEM Outreach Worker, April 24, 1991.

12. See Appendix D.


15. Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, a loosely-structured national coalition of community groups whose primary focus is on affordable housing and related issues for low and moderate income people.

redlining in July through October, 1990, including one article about a specific incident in Central neighborhood, which is located across Lake Street from Phillips.

17. See Appendix E.

18. CNIA Bylaws


22. Id. at 155.

23. See Appendix A.


27. Laska and Spain at 105-109.

28. Brian J.L. Berry; "Islands of Renewal in Seas of Decay,"


34. Wireman at 1-2.

35. *Id.* at 6

36. *Id.* at 6.


38. *Id.* at 16.


40. Described above, at 42.

41. Peterson at 117 ff.

42. Interview with Joel McEachin, Jacksonville preservation planner, on April 25, 1991.

43. Discussions with CNIA Executive Director Al Ickler, March 18, 1992.

44. Statements made by M. Holly, a proponent of Healy Block historic designation, in summer, 1989.

45. Discussion with Robert Disher, HSCC Executive Director, April, 1991.

46. Discussion with A. Ickler, February 27, 1992.

47. Wireman, at 6, discussed *supra* at 48.


51. Telephone discussion with a two-year resident of Second Avenue, April 1992.


APPENDIX A: The Charleston Principles

National Trust for Historic Preservation

A CALL TO ACTION FOR COMMUNITY CONSERVATION

Members of the national historic preservation community, assembled on October 20, 1990 in Charleston, South Carolina for the 44th National Preservation Conference, sponsored by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, adopted unanimously the following principles for comprehensive local government programs to conserve community heritage and made a pledge to have these principles become part of the policy of their communities.

We call on local leaders to adopt and act on these principles in order to improve their citizens' quality of life, increase their economic well-being, and enhance their community's heritage and beauty.

**Principle I:** Identify historic places, both architectural and natural, that give the community its special character and that can aid its future well-being.

**Principle II:** Adopt the preservation of historic places as a goal of planning for land use, economic development, housing for all income levels, and transportation.

**Principle III:** Create organizational, regulatory, and incentive mechanisms to facilitate preservation, and provide the leadership to make them work.

**Principle IV:** Develop revitalization strategies that capitalize on the existing value of historic residential and commercial neighborhoods and properties, and provide well designed affordable housing without displacing existing residents.

**Principle V:** Ensure that policies and decisions on community growth and development respect a community's heritage and enhance overall livability.

**Principle VI:** Demand excellence in design for new construction and in the stewardship of historic properties and places.

**Principle VII:** Use a community's heritage to educate citizens of all ages and to build civic pride.

**Principle VIII:** Recognize the cultural diversity of communities and empower a diverse constituency to acknowledge, identify, and preserve America's cultural and physical resources.
APPENDIX B: Typical Structures in Springfield and Central Neighborhoods

Stick Victorian Homes, built during the late 1880s, in Central (above) and Springfield (below) Neighborhoods.
Typical, large homes in Central Neighborhood.

Typical, large homes on one of the SNHS "Model Blocks" in Springfield Neighborhood.
Bungalow-style Homes, built during the mid-nineteen-teens, in Central (above) and Springfield (below) Neighborhoods.
Examples of brick Prairie style, multiple housing in Central (above) and Springfield (below) Neighborhoods.
Examples of stucco-exterior Prairie style, multiple housing in Central (above) and Springfield (below) Neighborhoods.
Entryways of large, Queen Anne Victorian homes, built around 1890, in Central (above) and Springfield (below) Neighborhoods. Note the turned porch spindles and "Gingerbread" decorative brackets.
Suburban, tract-style infill housing on Fourth Avenue in Central Neighborhood, built during the 1970s. Note the shallow roof pitches and box-like appearance of the structures.

Homes on the 3100 block of Clinton Avenue South (revitalization block), in Central Neighborhood. Note the similar roof pitch and proportions between the original (left) and infill (right) structures.
Deteriorated, low-income housing in the Central Neighborhood. The structure on the left has recently been condemned.

Restored "shotgun" housing in Macon, Georgia, financed using a combination of preservation and low income housing tax credits.
APPENDIX C: Map of Springfield Neighborhood
APPENDIX D: Springfield Historic District Design Competition Implementation Plan

1. **Purpose** - The design competition for the Springfield National Register Historic District is intended to effectively interweave the construction of replacement public housing and new housing for low and moderate income families into the social, economic and historic fabric of the neighborhood; and to develop models for including resident participation in shaping their neighborhoods future and design requirements for infill housing in other older downtown neighborhoods.

2. **Procedures** - The National Trust for Historic Preservation will provide overall management, coordination, and administration for the project, and ensure compatibility of the design competition with Springfield's revitalization goals. Implementation of the design competition will adhere to the following procedures:

   a. An Architectural Design Expert, chosen by The National Trust, will establish the "nature and scope of the design problem", chair an advisory panel to establish design criteria and site specifications, develop competition guidelines and requests for qualifications for architects, provide direction to the selection panel, and prepare a technical report on the design competition as a model for addressing public and affordable housing in older downtown neighborhoods.

   b. The project advisory panel will include local, state, regional, and national leaders in order to ensure that design competition principles and criteria respond to the needs and interests of residents in the neighborhood and the City's overall housing goals, and that they reflect the highest standards of design excellence and have value and meaning for meeting low and moderate housing needs in other older city neighborhoods. The advisory panel, chaired by the design expert, will establish the criteria for the competition, develop design specifications for the individual sites, establish procedures for competitively selecting up to 10 architects to design replacement units, establish standards for selecting designs, and appoint a selection committee to judge entries in the competition. The advisory panel will include nine representatives from:

   - * American Institute of Architects, Washington D.C.
   - * The National Trust for Historic Preservation
     - Center for Historic Houses
     - Historic Properties Department
     - Southern Regional Office in Charleston
     - Office of Financial Services
The advisory panel will appoint a nine member selection committee from representatives of the following organizations:

- Florida State Historic Preservation Office - one representative
- Springfield Preservation and Restoration - one representative
- American Institute of Architects, Local Chapter - two representatives
- Springfield Ecumenical Ministries - one representative
- Historic Landmarks Commission - one design professional representative
- Springfield Neighborhood Housing Service - one representative
- Historic Springfield Community Council - one representative
- Neighborhood resident - one representative

d. In order to engender creativity and innovation in the design of the proposed 20 public housing and 20 market rate units on as many as 15 infill sites, up to 5 architects will be competitively selected by the advisory board, based upon their professional qualifications and their experience in developing design solutions for sites similar to those presented in Springfield. Each commissioned architect will be invited by the advisory panel to submit design solutions for the same four distinctive sites. The project selection committee appointed by the advisory panel will select the architect who has most successfully demonstrated an overall ability to create compatible design solutions for the four distinctive sites.

The selection committee will judge entries against the standards developed by the advisory committee. The commissioned architects will submit plans and a written presentation for each of their entries. Over several days, the selection committee will review the commissioned designs. Each architect will make a presentation to the selection committee, including a site tour and discussion of architectural plans for each entry. Presentations must address how the design
responds to the overall purpose and goals of the competition, as well as applications of the design principles and criteria to the specific site.

The winning architect will be retained by the City of Jacksonville to develop final drawings and bid documents for the construction of all 40 units of infill housing.

e. **Competition Timetable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Jacksonville acquires infill housing sites</td>
<td>May 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint advisory panel</td>
<td>June 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select commissioned architects</td>
<td>October 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit entries</td>
<td>April 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select entries</td>
<td>May 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award contracts for final design</td>
<td>July 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begin construction</td>
<td>Fall 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete construction</td>
<td>Through 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. The design competition process and results will be evaluated and disseminated both in terms of its impact on the neighborhood and the City, and its nationwide application.

At the conclusion of the competition, The National Trust will request the advisory panel, selection committee and commissioned architects to submit written evaluations of the project process and results against the purpose and goals of the project. City officials, community residents, and others with an interest in the project will be invited to submit their comments as well.

A final report of the competition will be prepared by The National Trust and design expert. The report on the competition process will be presented in The National Trust's *Forum* magazine in the Spring 1992 issue -- a journal for 3,000 preservation professionals. Reprints of the article will be available at no cost. A full technical report on the competition results will be published separately and available to interested parties at cost. Results of the competition will also be reported in *Preservation News*, reaching The National Trust's 250,000 members.

The National Trust will make presentations on the result of the design competition at its annual meeting in Fall 1992, as well as at other professional meetings and in other journals.
3. Sites - All sites to be included in the design competition are to be approved for acquisition by the district councilperson and, subsequently, by the full Council. The mix (public housing, market rate) and number of units to be constructed on a particular site are to be established prior to acquisition and approved by the district councilperson. Sufficient sites shall be acquired to construct twenty public housing and twenty market rate units in Springfield.

4. Construction/Permanent Financing -

a) Public Housing - The twenty public housing units will be constructed utilizing fiscal year 1991 U.S. HUD development funds and Duval County Housing Finance Authority contributory grant funds made available for this purpose. Since these units are considered as replacement housing for those demolished at Blodgett, U.S. HUD has already committed to fund construction, subject to the availability of future appropriations. It is anticipated that the City will recapture most, if not all, of the site acquisition costs and architectural fees and commissions associated with construction from these U.S. HUD development funds for these twenty units.

b) Market Rate - Construction financing for the twenty market rate units will be provided by local lenders. In order to encourage lender participation, the City will provide for a percentage guarantee (to be determined by negotiation) of the total construction cost which is estimated to be $1.3 million. However, lender funds shall be used first in meeting any deficiencies prior to the use of any City funds. The source of guarantee funds may derive from the proceeds from the sale of south Blodgett to the State. The twenty market rate units are to be permanently financed by local lenders. However, the City would make second mortgages of up to $10,000 available to assist eligible home buyers (i.e. those bankable, owner-occupant families earning 120 percent or less of the median family income for the area) who could not otherwise qualify due to over indebtedness. These funds would derive from proceeds from the sale of south Blodgett to the State. The remaining portion of the purchase price would be secured by a first mortgage from either conventional, FHA, or bond financing sources. The purchase price shall not exceed the U.S. HUD established total development cost limits. The purchaser shall be encouraged to make a down payment of up to five percent (5%) of the sales price from his or her personal resources, to be determined by ability to pay.

The term of the City financed second mortgage shall not exceed 30 years or be co-terminus with the applicable first mortgage whichever is lesser. The mortgage shall be secured by a deed of trust or mortgage upon the home in favor of the City. Interest shall accrue at the rate
of one percent (1%) per annum. However, no interest shall be charged for the first five loan years and no payments of principal or interest shall be due during the first five loan years. Thereafter the loan shall be repaid over the remaining loan term in level monthly payments of principal and interest. The outstanding principal and unpaid interest shall be due upon sale or refinancing.

A local not-for-profit housing corporation shall act as developer for the project: identify buyers, assist buyers in obtaining first mortgage financing, establish a list of qualified and interested builders from which the buyer may choose, and oversee construction.

5. Sources/Uses of Funds - The source of funds for the City's share of the Design Competition's costs is the Blodgett Redevelopment budget (account #735076)

(a) Sources of Funds

City of Jacksonville* $120,000

Total Sources of Funds $120,000

(b) Uses of Funds

National Trust - Coordination $13,500
Local Coordination 9,000
Design Expert 48,000
Panel (Travel, Meeting, etc.) 4,500
Final Report/Publication 5,000

Subtotal $80,000

5 Architects/4 designs each $1,500 X 20 $30,000
5 Architects/travel and Presentations $2,000 X 5 10,000

Subtotal $40,000

Total Uses of Funds $120,000

* Land acquisition costs and architectural fees for final designs are not included as they are intended for recapture through sale proceeds.
APPENDIX E: Map of Central Neighborhood
APPENDIX F: Contributing and Non-Contributing Structures in the Healy Block

1. Please provide a copy of the preliminary study's findings.

2. What are the costs and benefits of changing the zoning?

3. What is the current government's stance on the matter?

4. Has there been a survey of the community on this issue? What were the results?

5. What are the long-term implications of this change?

6. Have private property owners and businesses been consulted or affected?

7. Provide data on the number of inspections and maintenance activities in the four "project areas".

8. What are the specific advantages and disadvantages of this approach?

9. What are the conditions that have led to the proposed regulations?

10. What are the conditions of the businesses that have been requested to contribute?

11. Has there been any public opposition to this proposal?

12. What form of public involvement is enshrined in the proposal, and how is success being measured?

13. Having been involved in the process for several years, what worked well and what would you do differently?

Contributing and Non-Contributing Structures in the Healy Block

- Non-Contributing
- Primary Contributing
- Secondary Contributing

APPENDIX G: Springfield Interview Questions

1. Please provide a copy of the demographics from the recent survey and preliminary 1990 census results, if available.

2. What are the terms for the loan and grant funds available?

3. What is the degree of government involvement in the project at all levels?

4. Has there been a survey of the condition of housing in the neighborhood? What were the defining parameters of the survey and results?

5. What were the guidelines used for historic designation in Jacksonville?

6. Have private developers become involved and how was that involvement obtained/encouraged?

7. Provide crime statistics for comparison; have they or the crime profile changed in areas subject to initial development?

8. What are acquisition and rehabilitation costs in Springfield?

9. What are formal/informal interactions between and among the relevant governmental, business and community organizations and individuals (e.g. housing inspections and preservation group, county road maintenance and everybody else, the four "project partners")?

10. What are locations of business districts, how many are there, how long has deterioration occurred and how far has it progressed, what percentage of businesses are locally owned and what percentage chain/other owned, and is there a business association or similar in any?

11. Has there been opposition from minority or low income residents? What are their fears?

12. What form is outreach to low income/minority residents taking, how is success being measured, how successful is it?

13. Having been involved in the process for over two years, what worked well and what would you do differently?
14. What are stated lines of communication, where do they work well and where does communication break down?

15. Where is the project on its timeline for rental or low income housing? How is progress being measured?

16. Since the project began, has rate of homeownership increased, decreased or remained the same? Has absentee property ownership increased, decreased or remained the same? What is the percentage of resident displacement, and where are residents going (renting elsewhere in neighborhood, buying, or out of neighborhood)? What percentage of those leaving the neighborhood are renters and what percentage are homeowners?

17. How is personal safety dealt with for SCOP volunteers? What is their training, what is its emphasis, and how is safety addressed? How is liability for the program or volunteers' actions dealt with by HSCC (e.g. insurance, training, releases, etc.)?

18. Where is the nearest police station, and are there any satellite "substations?" I'd like a clearer idea of SCOP volunteer demographics and of volunteer interaction with police.

19. What is the current situation regarding concerns of "harassment" by SCOP volunteers, and how are concerns being addressed?

20. Have any changes in level or quality of city/county services or in public employees' attitudes been observed since designation or since institution of the project?

21. What are transportation issues in the neighborhood and how are they being addressed?

22. What was the result of the March city elections and how has it impacted/is it likely to impact the project?

23. How are employment/self sufficiency programs working? How are they organized, what is the bureaucratic (state/fed/county) context, and what role do hospitals and other local employers play in developing programs?

24. How did you get the hospitals and other large employers to cooperate in encouraging employees to locate in the immediate vicinity?

25. Is the issue of self-maintenance of residences and resident skill-building to do same being addressed? How, with what degree of success, and how is success being measured?
26. Please provide further details regarding SEM's clinic card/health care access program, e.g. participation guidelines, how it dovetails with other health care access programs, and hospitals' role in the program. Provide copies of any cooperative or other agreements.

27. What is SHARE's protocol for tenant screening and property management, or is this still being developed?

28. Further details on the PRIDE program, especially copies of relevant agreements would be useful.

29. How was the nonprofit development arm of SNHS organized and what is the interaction between it and SNHS?

30. How is the neighborhood zoned, how specific and complex is Jacksonville's zoning code, and how has this/might this impact on the project?

31. How are conflicts between preservation standards and code enforcement dealt with (e.g. where health code mandates covering lead based paint and preservation standards won't allow it, where housing code would require adding a landing to entry stairs inconsistent with history or design, or similar situations)?

32. What other issues or programs have resulted from the project?
REFERENCES


33. Porter, Elizabeth T.; Historic Preservation in a Low-Income Neighborhood; (Unpublished case study, Department of Government and International Affairs, University of South Florida); Fall, 1990.

34. Powderhorn Community Analysis and Action Recommendations; Publication #156; Minneapolis, MN: Community Improvement Program; Spring, 1965.


40. Twenty Year Revitalization Plan Technical Advisory Committee; *Report*; Minneapolis, MN: January 1990.


